Too Much but Never Enough: Government Overburden and Backlashes to State-Building in Medieval Japan

Erik Haixiao Wang, New York University
Weiwen Yin, University of Macau

Could state-building undermine the state? We argue that rapid expansion of state reach can generate governance demands that overwhelm the government, thereby fueling grievances and unrest. We test this argument using data from Japan under the Kamakura Shogunate (1185–1333), where the Mongol invasions prompted the state to strengthen its control over regions deemed important for national defense. Difference-in-differences analyses show that this expansion triggered rebellions. It also caused long-run state decay, evidenced by the proliferation of private castles after the Shogunate’s collapse. Further analyses indicate that state-building sharply increased disputes brought to the state for arbitration and heightened frustration over unresolved disputes, which in turn fueled rebellion. Our findings highlight the interplay between state reach and administrative competence as different dimensions of state capacity. When the expansion of state reach outpaces the government’s ability to manage the rising governance demands, such over-extension paradoxically erodes the long-term viability of state institutions.

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 Presented in Session 8. Surveillance, Health, and Settler Administration