

The pathos of process: imagining impact and outcome in public interest scenario projects

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Abstract: This paper addresses the relationship between imagination, action, and outcomes by studying the social and political effects of public interest scenario interventions. Scenario exercises convene heterogeneous – and sometimes adversarial – groups of participants in purposeful, facilitated deliberations that explore multiple possibilities for how collective futures could unfold. Scenario techniques have been used since the 1990s to facilitate conversations on problems ranging from the future of democracy to transitions from armed conflict, urbanization, energy use, food security, and adaptation to climate change. Many proponents have high hopes for the transformative potential of scenario work; they see its extended time horizons, multi-perspectival thinking, and dialogic ethos as antidotes to many of the maladies of transnational interventions focusing on development, democracy, and peacebuilding. Yet these projects have struggled for credibility in comparison to conventional forecasting tools, and their political, institutional and personal consequences are hard to trace. I examine the precarious link between imagination and outcomes through an investigation of five clusters of public interest scenario work across multiple world regions in 1991-2017, with a particular focus on projects in East Africa and Latin America. I examine the theories of change expressed by practitioners and participants, along with their assessments of the strengths and weaknesses of this work and its influences on networks and careers. I also draw on media and historical sources for evidence of the degree to which scenario interventions have (or have not) resulted in the reframing of political projects or policies. I consider the sense of paralysis (or “pathos”) that can emerge as people attempt to transform imagined possibilities into tangible outcomes amidst uncertainty and crisis. Finally, I consider to what degree the credibility struggles of this method may stem directly from its pragmatist commitments, including its insistence on reflective dialogue and the unpredictability and multiplicity of futures.

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To what extent does imagining multiple possibilities for what *could* happen in the future help us make better decisions in the present? How can we assess the impacts of these future-oriented imaginaries on pathways of action, as these inform both individual lives and historical events? This is a thorny sociological question, given that the effects of imagined futures have not happened yet when viewed prospectively, while their open-ended and polythetic qualities tend to disappear when we look back at them (Schutz 1951, 1967). And yet there are many claims in both sociology and popular culture that future expectations and social imaginaries shape outcomes (Mische 2009, 2014; Tavory and Eliasoph 2013; Beckert 2016; Beckert and Suckert 2020, 2020), although not always in ways that we want or expect (Merton 1936; Mica 2017, 2018).

In this paper, I address these theoretical questions about the relationship between imagination, action, and outcomes through a consideration of the social and political effects of public interest scenario projects,” that is, purposeful, facilitated deliberations that explore multiple possibilities for how collective futures could unfold. Scenario methodologies were pioneered in military and corporate contexts in the 1970s in response to perceived failures in conventional forecasting methods (Andersson 2012, 2018; Fosbrook 2017) (Fosbrook 2017; Andersson 2018). They have been broadly used in government planning contexts (Andersson and Keizer 2014; Janzwood and Piereder 2019) and migrated to the non-profit or “civic” sector in the 1990s, after their well-publicized use during transitions from apartheid South Africa and civil wars in Colombia and Guatemala (Kahane 2012; Finlev 2012). Since then, scenario techniques have been used to facilitate conversations on problems ranging from the future of democracy to transitions from armed conflict, urbanization, energy use, food security, and adaptation to climate change.

Scores of public interest scenario workshops have taken place around the world, with a particular surge following the 2008 global financial crisis. Scenario exercises convene heterogeneous – and sometimes adversarial – groups of participants, including academic or professional experts, government and corporate leaders, social movements, civil society organizations, and local residents or citizens (Mische and Mart 2025). Some are national in scope (the future of Kenya or Indonesia) while others have global, regional, or municipal foci (the future of global climate governance, democracy in Latin America or urban informality in Bangkok). These projects have been supported by transnational networks of researchers, consultants, and donors. Some involve broad public or stakeholder dialogues, while others rely on expert consultations (or a hybrid of both). While sharing common rationales and techniques, they vary on core dimensions, including their inclusivity, their aggressiveness in pursuing diverse and contending viewpoints, and their proximity to elites and powerholders.

One of the core assumptions underlying all varieties of scenario work is that re-imagining the future – that is, rethinking assumptions and expectations about possible pathways – can steer action in more productive directions and thus lead to better outcomes. When we slow down, step

back, and consider multiple possibilities for what could happen, we gain more flexibility and insight in responding to “whatever comes.” Practitioners claim that scenario work enables collectivities to engage in challenging conversations that help them generate new framings of the future; these dialogues can then inform decisions and actions that participants take on the basis of those re-framings (van der Heijden 2005; Kahane 2012; Ramírez and Wilkinson 2016). In this way, they argue, we can avoid the bad futures and steer towards the better ones. As I have discussed elsewhere (Mische 2022; Mische and Mart 2025), these assumptions are deeply rooted in pragmatist understandings of the value of cognitive reflection, rehearsal in imagination, public deliberation and collective learning, with the goal of restoring a sense of what Dewey (1922) calls “actionability” in problematic or blocked situations.

In the case of public interest scenario work, these good outcomes are usually framed not in terms of individual gain, profitmaking, or managerial efficiency (as in corporate or government sectors), but rather in terms of human flourishing and collective well-being, as implicit or explicit “ultimate” ends, in Weber’s sense. These publicly oriented goals are often mediated by other “good” things like conflict reduction, effective governance, economic vitality, civic participation, social inclusion, poverty alleviation and environmental sustainability (with some specific subset of these collective goods generally the target of the scenario interventions). Such aspirational outcomes are imagined in comparison to much more problematic or harmful pathways, particularly coming from shortsighted, narrowly focused, or self-interested action on the part of actors who are not examining the “whole picture.” Scenario work understands itself as a response to what Tutton (2017) eloquently describes as “wicked futurity,” that is, futures that are hard to know and challenging to act upon, but that present very real dangers in the here and now. The gambit of scenario work is that such public dangers (and their juxtaposed aspirations) can be productively addressed through purposeful collective deliberation and intervention.

However, the passage from imagination to action is rarely smooth or straightforward. In a recent article, Timo Walters (2025) warns against overly cognitive or “semantic” understandings of the future, arguing that the connection between imagined futures and action in the present is better understood as highly relational, indexically embedded in particular historical and interactional situations, and constructed through ambiguous and multivalent moves with uncertain outcomes. While not discounting the social role of future imaginaries, Walters’s critique suggests that the link between imagination and action is often precarious and shaped by broader social embeddings. Moreover, scenario projects themselves are more than exercises in cognitive reframing; they are also complex political and normative interventions, resulting both from the heterogeneity of the publics they convene, as well as the multi-pronged nature of the futures they envision. For both of these reasons it becomes quite difficult to pin down the “effects” or “outcomes” of these interventions, a challenge readily admitted by practitioners.

In what follows, I examine the precarious link between imagination, action, and outcomes through an investigation of five interconnected clusters of public interest scenario projects across multiple world regions in 1991-2017 (see Table 1). I examine the *theories of change* underlying this work through interviews with practitioners, participants and donors, as well as through in-depth case studies of several projects in East Africa and Latin America. I consider how participants assess the strengths and weaknesses of these projects, along with reported influences on their networks and careers. I also draw on media and historical sources for

independent evidence of the degree to which scenario interventions have (or have not) resulted in the reframing of political projects or policies.

I find that many proponents have high hopes and expectations for the transformative potential of scenario work; they see its extended time horizons, multi-perspectival thinking and dialogic ethos as antidotes to many of the maladies of transnational interventions focusing on development, democracy and peacebuilding. At the same time, they report that these projects have struggled for credibility in comparison to conventional forecasting tools, and they acknowledge that their political, institutional and personal consequences are hard to trace. I consider the sense of paralysis (or “pathos”) that can emerge as people attempt to transform imagined possibilities into tangible outcomes amidst uncertainty and crisis. Finally, I consider to what degree the credibility struggles of this method may stem directly from its pragmatist commitments, including its insistence on reflective dialogue and the unpredictability and multiplicity of futures.

Public interest scenario projects as precarious interventions

Scenario deliberations are part of a broader toolkit of “foresight” methods that has emerged globally in recent decades, ranging from strategic forecasting to participatory exercises in scenario building and alternative visioning (Andersson 2018). Within this burgeoning array of cultural technologies for envisioning the future, scenario methods make a particularly interesting intervention. Scenario thinking positions itself in distinction both to approaches that see the future as an *object* of scientific forecasting and control and to those that see it as the *creation* of our agency and critical imagination.¹ The core difference from forecasting and visioning is the focus on *multiple, plausible futures* rather than singular probable, possible, or desirable ones. Scenarios generate multi-stranded futures by drawing both on “real world” indicators, drivers, and trends, and on narrative recastings of contingently unfolding possibilities for where those forces might lead. Most scenario methods combine quantitative and narrative approaches in some way; the public interest scenario processes that I study here tend to focus heavily on the storytelling dimension, although some also draw on simulations and trend analysis. They rely on the dialogue between multiple perspectives in scenario workshops to challenge “group think,” while considering possibilities with more temporal reach and imaginative breadth than “official” or conventionally expected futures.

In many ways, the extended time horizons, multi-perspectival thinking and dialogic ethos of scenario planning would seem to be the ideal antidote to the frequently noted maladies of many transnational NGO interventions and civil society reform efforts focusing on development, democracy and peacebuilding. As a growing critical literature documents, many of these interventions suffer from tendency toward short-term thinking (reinforced by “project-based” funding and reporting cycles); a reliance on unilinear change theories that do not reach across multiple sectors and systems; a focus on technocratic solutions that do not think “smartly” about politics and power dynamics; and the imposition of organizational and discursive templates that

¹ Note: one prominent practitioner rejected my characterization of scenarios as a “bridge” between these perspectives, claiming rather that scenario thinking is “orthogonal” to both forecasting and visioning

are not responsive to local cultural and relational contexts.² The cultural scaffolding for more temporally extended, “middle range” thinking offered by cultural technologies such as scenario thinking should, at least in principle, be ideally situated to address precisely these sorts of problems.

Yet despite this promising “match” between problem and response, the *political and institutional consequences* of these deliberations are far from clear. Scenario planning as a public intervention has struggled for credibility among change agents, donors and powerholders, and is often sidelined in comparison to the more conventional policy tools of forecasting and strategic planning. The more dialogic and narratively oriented scenario approach can be dismissed either as “soft” or overly critical by powerholders and/or technocrats who feel that their expertise or authority is threatened. Or alternatively, such processes can become ways of coopting civic and oppositional leaders into projects of governance or public legitimation.

Scenario practitioners often lament that their rich, if contentious processes of imagining and debating possible futures have less influence than they would have hoped. For example, when I interviewed organizers of an extended scenario process called *Kenya at the Crossroads*, they expressed great enthusiasm for the opportunity to “stop and think” about the country’s longer-term future, and they appreciated the insights about Kenya’s potential pathways that their diverse and sometimes contentious team produced.³ At the same time, they were attuned to the challenges and weaknesses of the methodology. When invited to share their frustrations with the experience, they noted: (a) the difficulty in finding funding for these kinds of more extended scenario processes; (b) the difficulty of establishing the legitimacy for this “long view” approach among political and economic powerholders (“why didn’t they listen to us?”); and (c) the difficulty in documenting the pathways of influence that they strongly felt existed.

The challenge of documenting if and how scenario processes make a difference is compounded by ambiguous and multi-faceted nature of their claimed benefits. Unlike forecasting methods, the stated goal of most scenario methods is not to predict or control the future. Rather, they aim to “prepare for,” “reframe” or sometimes “avoid” imagined possibilities within the context of present action. For example, one of the Kenyan scenarios, *El Niño*, considered the social breakdown that might occur if the country did not engage in inclusive economic development while strengthening democratic institutions. Several years later, the project was credited with having “foreseen” the country’s 2007-2008 election violence in the *El Niño* story. However, the intent of the *Kenya at the Crossroads* project was not to predict, but rather to *steer away* from that future. Scenarios can thus have perverse legitimacy effects; perceived

² For example, see Mosse 2005, 2011; Escobar 2011; Mac Ginty 2011; Krause 2014; Booth and Unsworth 2014; Richmond 2016; Watkins and Swidler 2013; Swidler and Watkins 2009, 2017.

³ The *Kenya at the Crossroads* as initiated in 1998-2000 by a group of young Kenyan professionals who were concerned about the intense disagreement about political and economic models as Kenya neared the end of the autocratic government of Daniel Moi. The project was sponsored by two locally based think tanks, the Society for International Development and the Institute for Economic Affairs. The project convened over 80 Kenyans from broad-ranging backgrounds in an extensive two-year process of research and dialogue, with workshops in different regions of the country. The team produced four scenarios for Kenya’s future, varying in relation to the degree to which Kenya engaged in economic and democratic reforms *Maendeleo*, *Katiba*, *El Niño* and *Flying Geese*.

predictive “success” – at least in relation to the more dire scenarios – can in some cases indicate a “failure” of the scenario process to adequately influence policy.

Indeed, most rationales for scenario methods focus on not on predictive accuracy, but on cognitive, relational, equity, and resilience benefits. For example, a recent review of 23 participatory scenario planning processes in 20 countries in the field of socio-ecological management (Oteros-Rozas et al 2015) notes that claimed benefits include: (a) increasing the equity, legitimacy and quality of decision-making; (b) encouraging mutual learning and partnerships among stakeholders, policy-makers and researchers; (c) supporting complex, flexible thinking as the basis for community resilience and adaptation to uncertainty; and (d) generating novel solutions that go beyond simplistic win/win approaches by addressing trade-offs, power relations and governance dilemmas that are often overlooked. Note that none of these claimed benefits focus on prediction *per se*.

This same review also notes problems in the use of participatory scenario planning (PSP) approaches. These include cultural barriers to communication in diverse, multi-level groups, difficulties in navigating conflict among unequal powerholders, and the challenge of assessing the longer term social and political impacts. “Although the goal of PSP is to promote action, it is challenging to produce evidence that PSPs have actually led to management actions, new partnerships and collaborations between stakeholders, or social learning processes” (Oteros-Rozas et al 2015, p. 12). The lack of adequate assessment procedures is a particular challenge for these practitioners, echoing the concerns of my Kenyan respondents about the difficulties in tracking pathways of institutional influence.

How do we assess impact of scenario interventions when the goals are multiple, ambiguous and diffuse? One possibility is that the effects of these kinds of deliberation will tend to be more *individual* and *relational* than institutional. That is, the primary effects of participation in such scenario-building projects will be to (a) inform the values, career choices, and theories of change of leaders and participants; and (b) generate mutual learning, partnerships, and coalitions among civil society groups. However, institutional uptake into state and interstate reform efforts will be more difficult, rare, and hard to trace directly.

At the same time, it is possible that that these sorts of future-oriented deliberations will have deeper and more tangible influences on institutional reform efforts under the following conditions: (a) when they have elite champions; (b) when the state creates formal mechanisms for input, feedback, and accountability; (c) when core sponsoring organizations are embedded in direct lobbying, advocacy, or protest efforts (rather than simply humanitarian or technical assistance) that target state or interstate agencies; (d) when there is a strong sense of social urgency and crisis; and (e) when deliberative processes are broad, inclusive, and cut across power divides. In situations in which public deliberations about the future are disconnected from institutional power and decision-making – as in many of the scenario processes I study here – their influence may be visible on the individual or cultural level, but may fail to have lasting impacts on political and social reform efforts.

The effects of these processes are notoriously difficult to trace, and this study admittedly only takes us part of the way there. In the sections ahead, I map the claims and rationales underlying scenario work and provide case studies of projects in East Africa and Latin America that probe practitioners’ accounts of how they think these scenario processes have made a



difference in their own personal lives and careers, as well as in broader processes of social and political change. In Kenya, for example, I interviewed and surveyed over 100 participants in two extensive scenarios processes, the *Kenya at the Crossroads* scenarios (1998-2000) and the 2011 *Kenya Youth Scenarios* (2011). In Brazil, I interviewed scenario practitioners that guided several projects related to the future of democracy, civil society, and education. As expected, participants report stronger individual and networks effects than institutional and policy effects. However, the latter are hard to verify beyond the anecdotal and the former may be colored by retrospective self-shaping.

The sections ahead consider these effects across the five clusters of scenario practices listed in Table 1. These projects are differently positioned in relation to national powerholders, professional expertise, international donors, and local communities, allowing me to consider how their theories of change and assessments of effects vary according to different positionalities, including their relative connection to institutional channels of influence. While I place particular emphasis on the first two clusters (specially projects in East Africa and Latin America), I compare these to three other clusters of scenario practice: CGIAR's research program on Climate Change, Agriculture, and Food Security; the Strategic Insight program of the World Economic Forum; and the Rockefeller Foundation's "Informal City Dialogues." (Synopsis of each of the included projects can be found in Table 1.)

In short, participant enthusiasm about the potentiality of scenario methods for provoking much needed reflectivity about collective futures – and their genuine enjoyment of the experience of participation in these projects – are tempered by a wistful uncertainty about what impact, if any, they are having on the futures they care about. As a result of the precarity in their ability to identify (and verify) longer term effects, they often retreat back to a celebration of the "process" of scenario work, especially with regard to the shared learning (and cognitive "reframing") that it enables. However, this excitement is often tinged with a sense of sadness and even paralysis, as they reflect on difficulty in ascertaining the degree to which future imaginaries are in fact influencing actions and outcomes in the world beyond the workshop.

In the paper's conclusion, I consider to what degree the credibility struggles of public interest scenario projects in broader fields of social intervention may in fact stem directly from the method's pragmatist commitments, including its foundational skepticism about our forecasting capacities, as well as its insistence on the unpredictability and multiplicity of futures. Scenario methods generate unease on several fronts: they simultaneously allow less certainty than institutional planners demand, more critique than powerholders are comfortable with, and more ambiguity about action pathways than activists desire and need. Regardless of their positioning, foresight deliberations must be understood as political and not just technocratic processes, steeped in relations of power and contention even as they make claims on the transformative power of reflective dialogue.

Table 1: Five clusters of public interest scenario projects

TRANSFORMATIVE SCENARIO PLANNING (TSP)	
Mont Fleur Scenarios (1991-1992) 	Genre: Conflict Impasse Summary: This project was carried out in South Africa in 1991, just after Mandela was released from prison, but before the transition. It was convened by two professors from the University of West Cape and included “22 influential and insightful people: politicians, businesspeople, trade unionists, academics, and community activists; black and white; from the left and right; from the opposition and the establishment.” including the ANC, PAC, and de Klerk government. Three weekend workshops were facilitated by Adam Kahane, using scenario methodology from his experience at Royal Dutch Shell. Four scenarios: <i>Ostrich, Lame Duck, Icarus, Flight of the Flamingos</i>
Destino Colombia (1996-1998) 	Genre: Conflict Impasse Summary: The project was organized as an effort to help ease Colombia out of prolonged civil war after the first attempt at a peace accord. A group of business and civic leaders convened a team of 43 Colombians from different sectors and groups, many of whom represented groups in direct conflict with each other (including members of guerrilla factions and armed militias). The team met in three workshops over 14 days total. The project was supported by a large group of local and transnational business associations, and facilitated by Adam Kahane. Four scenarios: <i>When the Sun Rises, We'll See; A Bird in the Hand is Worth Two in the Bush; Forward March!; and In Unity Lies Strength.</i>
Alerta Democrática (2014-2015) 	Genre: Reformist Critique Summary: This project convened 37 leaders from 13 countries in Latin America to consider the future of democracy in the region. The team included “representatives from different social spheres, including politics, academia, private sector, and civil society.” After preliminary interviews with 65 “well-known people and key actors,” the team met for three 3-day workshops. The project was facilitated by the Brazilian team of Reos Partners, with funding from the Open Society Foundation, Ford Foundation, and Avina. Four scenarios: <i>Democracy in Tension, Democracy in Mobilization, Democracy in Agony, and Democracy in Transformation.</i>

EAST AFRICAN SCENARIOS (EAS)

Kenya at the Crossroads (1998-2000)



Genre: Reformist Critique

Summary: This project was initiated by a group of young Kenyan professionals who were concerned about the intense disagreement about political and economic models as Kenya neared the end of the autocratic government of Daniel Moi. The project was sponsored by two locally based think tanks, the Society for International Development and the Institute for Economic Affairs. The project convened over 80 Kenyans from broad-ranging backgrounds in an extensive two-year process of research and dialogue, with workshops in different regions of the country. The workshops were facilitated by British consultant Barbara Heinzen, with support from Arthur Muliro and Betty Maina.

Four scenarios: *Maendeleo, Katiba, El Niño and Flying Geese.*

Imagining the Future of East Africa (2005-2008)



Genre: Reformist Critique

Summary: This project was developed by Society for International Development as a way of extending the scenario methodology to the broader region, in the light of the development of the East African Community in 2006 and efforts to turn it into a federation. It was preceded by two reports on the State of East Africa and a 300+ page “research compendium.” The scenario-building team consisted of 45+ people, many of whom had participated in the Crossroads, Tanzania, and Uganda scenario projects. It was facilitated by Barbara Heinzen, with Arthur Muliro, Duncan Okello, and Aidan Eukkyze.

Three scenarios: *I want to be a star, I want a visa, USINIHARAKISHE! (Don't Rush Me!)*

Kenya Youth Scenarios (2011)




Genre: Reformist Critique.

Summary: This was a year-long project carried out by Kenya's Institute for Economic Affairs to consider the future of youth in Kenya, particularly in relation to the growing youth bulge and its potential effects on inequality, participation, and governance. After compilation of an extensive research compendium, nine week-long workshops were held with over 100 young people in every region of the country, followed by a national workshop that compiled insights and stories across the regional scenarios. The project was supported by the Rockefeller Foundation and facilitated by Katindi Sivi-Njonjo and Dr. Mshai Mwangola, with some assistance from Tessa Finlev (from IFTF)

Four scenarios: *Tsunami, Pond, Waterfall, and Ocean.*

CLIMATE CHANGE, AGRICULTURE AND FOOD SECURITY (CCAFS)

The future of future of food security, environments and livelihoods in Eastern Africa (conducted 2010-2011; target year 2030)



Genre: Expert-stakeholder

Summary: This project was carried out by CGIAR's Research Program on Climate Change, Agriculture and Food Security program, with the goal of understanding interrelationships among these three elements, and developing and assessing policy options for better adaptation to climate change. The East African project was coordinated by a team from Oxford that facilitated 4 workshops with 120 stakeholders from Kenya, Tanzania, Ethiopia, Uganda, Rwanda and Burundi, "drawn from governments, civil society, the research community, and the media." The scenarios were translated into semi-quantitative indicators and quantified with agricultural models IMPACT (from IFPRI) and GLOBIOM (from IISA). They were discussed in follow-up workshops with non-state and government actors.

Four scenarios: *Sleeping Lions, Lone Leopards, Herd of Zebras, Industrious Ants*

The future of future of food security, environments and livelihoods in Western Africa (conducted 2010-2012; target year 2050)



Genre: Expert-stakeholder

Summary: This project was also out by CGIAR's Research Program on Climate Change (see above), with the goal of guiding regional policy at regional, national, and sub-national levels. It was coordinated by a team from Oxford's Environmental Change Institute with regional partners. The scenarios were developed in 4 workshops for the ECOWAS region, with a focus on Burkina Faso, Senegal, Niger, Ghana and Mali. Workshops included 94 participants from governments, research organizations, national and regional CSOs, INGOs, academia, and the media, including regional agricultural research programs. The scenarios were translated into semi-quantitative indicators and quantified with agricultural models IMPACT and GLOBIOM.

Four scenarios: *Cash, Control & Calories, Self-Determination, Civil Society to the Rescue, Save Yourself*

Exploring the future(s) of Southeast Asia (conducted 2013, target year 2050)



Genre: Expert-stakeholder


Summary: This project was also out by CGIAR's Research Program on Climate Change (see above), In Southeast Asia, CCAFS partnered with the FAO's EPIC program and UNEP/WCMS, with a focus on Cambodia, Laos, and Vietnam. It involved a regional workshop I Vietnam with 30 participants to develop qualitative scenarios and semi-quantitative assessments. As with the others, the goal was to translate these into semi-quantitative indicators and quantified with agricultural models IMPACT and GLOBIOM, as use them inform discussions over agricultural policy in the region.

Four scenarios: *Land of the Golden Mekong, Buffalo, Buffalo (water flows uphill); The DoReKi Dragon, Tigers on a Train*

WORLD ECONOMIC FORUM (WEF)									
Scenarios for the Mediterranean Region (2010-2011) <table><tr><td>MediterrAfrica Rising</td></tr><tr><td>Resource Famine</td></tr><tr><td>Green Mobility</td></tr></table>	MediterrAfrica Rising	Resource Famine	Green Mobility	Genre: Elite Scoping Summary: These scenarios were produced with “the goal of exploring the long-term evolution and regional dynamics and the role of the private sector in the Mediterranean region.” They were developed through 50 interviews and workshops at meetings in Marrakech (in 2010) and Davos (2011). They also drew on data from the WEF <i>Global Competitiveness Report 2011-2012</i>. The year-long process brought together over 100 stakeholders from the private sector, government, academia, and international and non-governmental organizations in numerous discussions and face-to-face workshops. They were vetted and advised by members of WEF’s Global Agenda Councils. Three scenarios: <i>MediterrAfrica Rising, Resource Famine, Green Mobility</i>					
MediterrAfrica Rising									
Resource Famine									
Green Mobility									
The Future Role of Civil Society (2012-2013) <table><tr><td>Mad Max</td><td>Transparently Blurred</td></tr><tr><td>Conflict, control and a restricted space for CSOs</td><td>A transparent world with many engaged sectors</td></tr><tr><td>Turbulence and Trust Deficits</td><td>Privatized World</td></tr><tr><td>A turbulent, networked world where trust is scarce</td><td>The private sector grows in influence as governments fail</td></tr></table>	Mad Max	Transparently Blurred	Conflict, control and a restricted space for CSOs	A transparent world with many engaged sectors	Turbulence and Trust Deficits	Privatized World	A turbulent, networked world where trust is scarce	The private sector grows in influence as governments fail	Genre: Elite Scoping Summary: This project’s goal is to explore “the essential contribution of civil society to a resilient global system alongside government and business.” It engaged 200 leaders from civil society, business, government and international organizations, via 80 expert interviews and 5 strategic foresight workshops.” It targets two kinds of stakeholders: civil society leaders who want to explore their roles in future changes, and “leaders from business, government and international organizations” who wish to engage civil society and “appreciate the challenges and opportunities surrounding their activities.” The project had input from WEF’s Global Agenda Councils. Four scenarios: <i>Mad Max, Transparently Blurred, Turbulence and Trust Deficits, Privatized World</i>
Mad Max	Transparently Blurred								
Conflict, control and a restricted space for CSOs	A transparent world with many engaged sectors								
Turbulence and Trust Deficits	Privatized World								
A turbulent, networked world where trust is scarce	The private sector grows in influence as governments fail								
Shaping the Future of Global Food Systems (2016-2017) 	Genre: Elite Scoping Summary: These scenarios were produced by WEF’s “System Initiative on Shaping the Future of Food Security and Agriculture,” and facilitated by Deloitte Consulting. They were funded by Rockefeller, the Wellcome Trust and the governments of Canada and Netherlands. The initiative is described “a global network of over 600 organizations, aligned around a shared vision, which have taken action in 21 countries, mobilizing \$10.5 billion in investment commitments and benefiting over 10.5 million farmers.” The scenarios had input from “a group of world-class experts and Partner company executives,” including corporations, governments, NGOs, think tanks, and academia. They were vetted by WEF’s Transformation Leaders Networks. Four scenarios: <i>Survival of the Richest, Unchecked Consumption, Open-source Sustainability, Local is the New Global</i>								

INFORMAL CITY DIALOGUES (ICD)

Nairobi City Scenarios (2013)




Genre: Community Resilience

Summary: This project was part of the “Informal Cities Dialogue” in six cities worldwide, initiated by the Rockefeller Foundation, with Forum for the Future, Next City, and local partners. In Nairobi, the project was hosted by the Institute for Economic Affairs and involved the compilation of fact sheets and briefing papers, street dialogues, walkabouts, informal meetings, roundtables and an essay contest. The scenarios team consisted of 30 people “drawn from various sectors and representing the formal and informal sectors of the city.” The project culminated in four urban innovation proposals with one chosen for submission to Rockefeller for possible funding.

Four scenarios: *Big brother, Navujinia (“I am proud of”) City, Bonoko City, Vulture City*

Bangkok City Scenarios (2013)




Genre: Community Resilience

Summary: This project was part of Rockefeller’s “Informal Cities Dialogue” (see above). In Bangkok, the local partner was Chulalongkorn University’s Department of Urban and Regional Planning, and the workshop was facilitated by a team from Forum for the Future. The scenarios team involved 50 people, “most of them representatives of the informal city.” These included representatives of community organizations and alliances as well some government officials, scholars, and development practitioners. The two-day workshop was followed by and “Innovation Workshop” in which 20 urban improvement proposals were boiled down to one to submit to Rockefeller/

Four scenarios: *Curry Rice, Mixed veggie stew, Food court solo dishes, Sectioned plates*

Lima City Scenarios (2013)



Genre: Community Resilience

Summary: This project was also part of Rockefeller’s “Informal Cities Dialogue” (see above). The Lima workshops were conducted in partnership with FORO Nacional Internacional, a local think tank. The scenario building workshop was preceded by consultations with shantytown dwellers (including children and youth) to gauge their perceptions of the drivers of change. The scenario workshop included 30 people “representing the public and private sectors, as well as grassroots organizations.” As with the other projects, the Lima workshop was followed by and “Innovation Workshop” several weeks later to elaborate proposals and choose one take to Rockefeller.

Four scenarios: *Solidariedad para avanzar, Comunidad y riqueza, Yo mismo soy para sugar, Aporta para su seguridad y orden*

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