

**A Quantitative Analysis of the Second Party System in the Georgia Legislature from 1845
to 1854**

Jacob Martin

Dr. Jason Phillips

West Virginia University

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Abstract

Historians and politicians alike have debated the existence of the Second Party System since its collapse. This research uses the case study of Georgia to build on this discourse. First, the study traces institutional factors and six societal structures informing the Georgian political system: honor culture, regionalism, economic change, religion, gender, and race. Then, this study quantitatively analyzes legislator voting records in the Georgia House of Representatives from the 1845 to 1854 sessions within the context of eleven variables to find which best explains political behavior: party, region, religion, incumbency, white population, political class, class, slave population, slave proportion, frontier status, and the ratio of cash crops to food crops. Additionally, the project employs the Rice Index to measure party coherency. The regressions indicate that party was the best explanation of voting behavior, followed by region, class, and slave proportion, respectively. Both parties exhibited low Rice Index scores, indicating low party cohesion. Moreover, Rice Indices of specific policy issue areas show that both parties became less coherent in most issues. The Whigs, critically, lost cohesion surrounding their vital issues of development, banking, and taxes. This reveals a decline in the viability of the Whig Party and invites further research into the transformation (rather than the disappearance) of the party. Thus, while the Second Party System existed within Georgia between 1845 and 1854, it lacked strict party lines. This research displays that the SPS existed longer in Georgia than previously thought, raising questions about the prewar political fragmentation that eventually paved the way for secession and inviting further quantitative examinations of the SPS at the state level.

Introduction

“Mr. Yopp moved to suspend the order, to allow him to introduce the following resolution to wit:

Resolved, That no member of this branch of the General Assembly be allowed to speak more than twice on any subject, nor longer than fifteen minutes each time, without the unanimous consent of the whole House.

...

Mr. McDougald offered the following amendment: to wit ‘And that every member shall speak fifteen minutes on every question, and on failure to do so, that he vamose [sic].’¹

The Second Party System² in Georgia existed and constituted substantial ideological differences. As is evident from the quote above, these ideological differences frequently erupted into clashes of honor and belief in the operations of government.³ Although the SPS trickled down from national sources, it shaped state and local political dialogues. Within the South, Georgia was a prime example of the SPS at its most competitive. Prior research has largely failed to trace this strange percolation and subsequent development. This study quantitatively analyzes the legislative voting records within the Georgia House of Representatives from 1845 to 1854, tracing if the SPS existed in Georgia, what cleavages underlaid the system, and harbingers of its collapse. It found that party was the best predictor of vote, revealing that the SPS did exist as it shaped both political discourse and behavior.

National Contexts

The Second Party System was the political system of organization that followed the collapse of the First Party System dichotomy of Federalists and Anti-Federalists/Jeffersonian

¹ Georgia General Assembly. *Journal of the House of Representatives of the State of Georgia, 1853&1854* (Milledgeville, GA: Georgia General Assembly, 1854) 571.

² Hereafter SPS

³ Murray provides another similar example wherein Whigs seized a piece of paper condemning a handful of Whig politicians for their absence from the speaker and tore it up, twice; Paul Murray, *The Whig Party in Georgia*. (Chapel Hill, NC: University of North Carolina Press, 1948), 146.

Republicans. Martin Van Buren largely constructed the system both to formalize party structures (using the spoils system and national conventions, among other things) and to stabilize politics by shifting the focus from regionalism and slavery to nationalism.⁴ Van Buren pivoted the political cleavages towards disagreements based on development, banking, and tariffs, rather than regional concerns.

Largely, the system paid off. Voter turnout increased by more than 25% between the election of 1836 and 1840 and various sects throughout the country now had at least one political representative they could trust to fight for their values and interests.⁵ Most notably, this system, although it fell apart over the issue of slavery, had some success with at least delaying the irrepressible conflict. Additionally, the differences in the execution and passage of the 1820 Compromise and the Armistice of 1850 show a distinct shift in political culture from 1820 wherein a personalized group of aristocrats who all knew each other to savvy politicians in 1850 who knew their interests, their voters' interests, and their place in the party.⁶

David Wilmot's surprise proviso in the territorial debates of the Mexican American War spelled the end of the SPS just as it reached its acme in 1850. Previously, territorial expansion had been a unifying factor of American politics.⁷ With the polarization of expansion, one of the

⁴ Harry Watson correctly refutes the Romantic tradition of emphasizing "Great Men" of history in that many historians previously cited Andrew Jackson's democratization efforts as inspiring the mass politics of the later Antebellum period. Van Buren very clearly was the architect and proselyting prophet of the SPS as he first developed and applied it in his home state of New York. Martin Van Buren, *Inquiry into the Origins and Course of Political Parties in the United States*, (New York City: Hurd and Houton, 1867) https://www.google.com/books/edition/Inquiry_Into_the-Origin_and_Course_of_Po/nxcTAAAYAAJ?hl=en&gbpv=1; Harry L Watson, "Democrats and Whigs: The Second American Party System," in *The Oxford Handbook of American Political History*, Paula Baker & Donald T Critchlow editors (New York City: Oxford University Press, 2020).

⁵ This high level of voter engagement continued until the twentieth century; Watson, "Democrats and Whigs: The Second American Party System," 72.

⁶ David Potter & Don E. Fehrenbacher, *The Impending Crisis, 1848-1861*. (New York City: Harper and Row Publishers, 1976).

⁷ There were, of course, dissenters who wanted to focus more on developing the land the US already had rather than constantly acquiring new land. Many of these politicians were in the Whig party.

last cross-regional cords snapped. Within each and every issue, both Northerners and Southerners began to see slavery as the underpinning issue. For example, Stephen Douglas's desired railroad required netting Southern votes that wanted guarantees that any new territory or expansion would allow slavery. To Southerners, tariff debates were Northern aggression and an attempt to subjugate the South and its way of life. To Northerners, the 1850 Fugitive Slave Act was a draconian institution to re-enslave the North. The last straw for the SPS was the passage of the Kansas-Nebraska bill and the corresponding railroad legislation. The Missouri Compromise was one of the closest things to sacrosanct that existed in antebellum America. Stephen Douglas's political maneuvering destroyed it. For Northerners, the obviation of the compromise showed that Southerners were even unwilling to accept the bitter pill of popular sovereignty. Conversely, Southerners saw the repeal as evidence that the North was untrustworthy and no settled compromise would protect the South, its culture, and its economy. The SPS collapsed in the legislative elections of 1854, with various parties sprouting up across the nation.⁸

Underpinning the national SPS were four key cleavages: population distribution, religion, class, and geography. First, the US in the 1840s was booming. American innovation in manufacturing along with its robust agricultural sector ensured that the US had a stable marketplace in international markets as America was ascending the international order.⁹ America was growing and quickly urbanizing. By 1860, half of Americans were in non-agricultural fields of work.¹⁰ By far, the North outpaced the South both in population and economic growth. Van Buren had attempted to bypass this sectional division by centering economic debates on banking and capital which both rich planters and industrialists relied upon. Second, the growing Catholic minority in the North necessarily affected Northern iterations of the SPS. Because Catholics and

⁸ Most notably, the Know Nothing Party which held seats from New England to east Texas.

⁹ James McPherson, *Battle Cry of Freedom*, (New York City: Oxford University Press, 1988), 6-21.

¹⁰ McPherson, *Battle Cry of Freedom*, 9.

Protestants viewed their interests and culture as somewhat antithetical to one another, Irish Catholics largely sided with the Democrats and Protestants with the Whigs. The Whigs, therefore, had a definite xenophobic tint to their platforms that their successor, the Know-Nothing Party, fully embraced.¹¹ Third, the Democrats were largely the party of the working everyman and while the Whigs were that of the planter aristocrats and upper and middle class.¹² Fourth, geography played a major role in the SPS. Mountainous regions frequently voted opposite to the lowlands.¹³ Additionally, rural voters sided more with Democrats than Whigs, although the planter aristocracy was by no means urban and it largely sided with the Whigs.

The collapse of the national parties was largely due to both parties' failure to accomplish their prime directive: win power and organize votes. Sectionalism precluded any national movements from succinctly deciding, or even debating, the pressing issues of the day. When these parties proved ineffectual, enterprising elites used the tumult to bolster themselves and the people assented.¹⁴ While state iterations of the SPS created the institution itself, the SPS was a national system and organized votes in the 1840s and early 1850s. By the early 1850s, party

¹¹ Additionally, Whigs also made a pact with the xenophobic American Party in 1844, cementing their alliance with nativist platforms; Adam Silver, "Consensus and Conflict: A Content Analysis of American Party Platforms, 1840-1896.," *Social Science History* Vol. 42, No. 3 (Fall 2018) 441-467; Michael F Holt, *Political Parties and American Political Development from the Age of Jackson to the Age of Lincoln*, (Baton Rouge, LA: Louisiana State University Press, 1982) 63.

¹² Concurrently with the development of the SPS was the Market Revolution. The Market Revolution changed nearly every aspect of life. This included politics. In regions where the Market Revolution was in full swing, class (as opposed to regionalism) became the best determinant of party affiliation. While class distinctions existed in the South, they lacked the pure monetary basis of the North and relied on a system of honor; Marc Egnal, *Clash of Extremes: The Economic Origins of the Civil War*. (New York City: Hill and Wang, 2009); Kenneth S Greenberg, "The Nose, the Lie, and the Duel in the Antebellum South." *The American Historical Review* Vol. 95, No. 1 (Feb. 1990): 57-74.

¹³ See north Georgia, western Virginia, eastern Tennessee, etc. Moreover, these geographical divisions show how party systems operate in that people map these ideological structures and divides onto preexisting differences. While this occurred with geography, within Georgia, it also happened with prior personalized political factions.

¹⁴ Rachel Shelden & Erik B Alexander. "Dismantling the Party System: Party Fluidity and the Mechanisms of Nineteenth-Century U.S. Politics." *Journal of American History* Vol. 110, No. 3 (Dec 2023) 419-448.

labels were no longer useful to pass legislation or win power. The state and national parties interacted and greatly affected one another's political development.

Literature Review¹⁵

In this period of American history, voters were easily swayed, both materially and rhetorically. The Australian ballot did not yet exist. People toiled and people moved West.¹⁶ Political engagement was high, but this was largely due to the populist beliefs wherein the populace saw frightening institutions endangering their rights (e.g. the Second Bank of the United States). In this era, party systems were largely a mechanism for politicians rather than the public. People knew one another and knew their candidates. State issues mattered most and federal elected officials were mere representations and advocates of the state apparatus.¹⁷ Elections were personal. Thus, the SPS at the state level was very different to the federal SPS. This raises a more interesting question facing the anti-existential school: if the SPS did not really exist, why did it trickle down to the state governments? Put more clearly: if the parties of the SPS lacked coherent platforms and ideologies, then why did the state parties (by far more important to the everyday people) adopt the nomenclature? The answer is simple: the SPS was a tool of party elites to streamline the decision-making process. By labelling oneself as a Democrat, it broadly meant that one was open to anti-banking legislation and skeptical of federal expansion. Parties were a political tool. In state parties, this became essential to forming a

¹⁵ The scholarly literature regarding the SPS is incredibly expansive. This necessarily truncated historiography, therefore, cannot provide an exhaustive list. Historians have conducted myriad excellent qualitative studies of the SPS in various states and curious readers can consider the following list an excellent starting point: William G Shade, *Democratizing the Old Dominion: Virginia and the Second Party System, 1824-1861*, (Charlottesville, VA: The University of Virginia Press, 1996); James L Huston, "The Illinois Political Realignment of 1844-1860: Revisiting the Analysis," *Journal of the Civil War Era* Vol. 1, No. 4 (Dec. 2011): 506-535. Frank F Matthias, "The Turbulent Years of Kentucky Politics, 1820-1850," *The Register of the Kentucky Historical Society* Vol. 72, No. 4 (Oct. 1974): 309-318; John M Sacher, "The Sudden Collapse of the Louisiana Whig Party," *The Journal of Southern History* Vol 65, No. 2 (May 1999); Gary R Matthews, *More American than Southern: Kentucky, Slavery, and the War for an American Ideology, 1828-1861*. (Knoxville, TN: University of Tennessee Press, 2014).

¹⁶ This was especially true in the new Western states wherein people were constantly moving in and out.

¹⁷ Ibid, 114.

workable coalition with a newly enfranchised voter base and an exploding population. This is especially true in Georgia where only a third of the legislature was incumbent.¹⁸

This study investigates whether the SPS existed in Georgia. Methodology is addressed in the subsequent section, however, key definitions are essential. A party system bears four characteristics. First, it must function as an electoral tool to facilitate decision making and political alliances in a diverse political chamber.¹⁹ Second, a party system must be relatively stable wherein it organizes and aligns multiple successive elections and wherein each party has a realistic opportunity to win power.²⁰ Third, a party system must have a certain sense of predictability both for political actors and voters. To properly satisfy the first and second requirements, people and politicians must necessarily believe that elected officials' actions and policies will reflect the underlying principles candidates propounded. Finally, a party system must reflect political cleavages. According to Seymour Lipset and Stein Rokkan, "[a political] cleavage must involve three elements: a social division, such as occupational, religious, ethnic, or linguistic; a collective identity; and organizational expression in terms of political parties, trade unions, churches, or other associations."²¹

¹⁸ This study measures the difference in coherency between *new* and *old* guard within the legislature. While incumbents usually only comprised around a third of the House, representatives frequently took breaks and then re-entered the legislature. Thus, while the chamber was largely untrained (even electing speakers who and never previously served), it did have a political class (along with dynasty representatives who had a familial legacy and network to utilize). Murray traces a divide between the Old Whigs and New Whigs, but this study will actually study that behavior in action; Murray, *The Whig Party in Georgia*, 138; DeBats, *Elites and Masses*, 162; Georgia General Assembly. *Journal of the House of Representatives of the State of Georgia, 1845*. Milledgeville, GA: Georgia General Assembly, 1846; Georgia General Assembly. *Journal of the House of Representatives of the State of Georgia, 1847*. Milledgeville, GA: Georgia General Assembly, 1848; Georgia General Assembly. *Journal of the House of Representatives of the State of Georgia, 1849&1850*. Milledgeville, GA: Georgia General Assembly, 1850; Georgia General Assembly. *Journal of the House of Representatives of the State of Georgia, 1851&1852*. Milledgeville, GA: Georgia General Assembly, 1852; *Journal of the House of Representatives of the State of Georgia, 1853&1854*.

¹⁹ Holt, *Political Parties and American Political Development from the Age of Jackson to the Age of Lincoln*.

²⁰ One must note that when the Federalists could no longer feasibly win elections, the First Party System collapsed.

²¹ This study will use Herbert Kitschelt's revised definition that focuses more on enduring ideological differences rather than societal structures themselves. This study still relies on a structuralist lens and recognizes that ideas and societal structures continually affect one another. That being said, ideological conceptions of the surrounding world dominate political discourse and, therefore, should dominate a study of party systems. Van Buren, *Inquiry into the*

Scholarly debate surrounding the SPS has existed since the mid-19th century. There basically exist two schools of thought: the SPS existed and the SPS did not exist.²² The earliest form of this debate is evident in the writings of both Martin Van Buren and Alexander Stephens. In his *Inquiry into the Origins and Course of Political Parties in the United States*, Van Buren adapted James Madison's factional mechanism and held that political parties ensured that disagreeing actors could work through political disagreements in a safe and predictable manner.²³ Conversely, Alexander Stephens, writing a decade later, held that the SPS did not really exist: "Indeed no President was elected, from Mr. Jefferson to Mr. Lincoln, who denied [state compact theory]."²⁴ Stephens stated how the Whig William Henry Harrison had similar principles to Andrew Jackson as they both were Jeffersonian Republicans.²⁵

Origins and Course of Political Parties in the United States; Brown, "Whigs and the Politics of Statesmanship, 1833-1841."; Seymour Lipset & Stein Rokkan, editors. *Party Systems and Voter Alignments: Cross National Perspectives*. (New York City: Free Press, 1967); Herbert Kitschelt, "Formation of Party Cleavages in Post-Communist Democracies." *Party Politics* Vol. 1, No.4 (1995).

²² Of course, as with any dialectic, there exists a gradient wherein scholarship may not take an unyielding stance within a single school but may blend the approaches. Despite this gradient, virtually all scholarship comes down on one side or the other. While virtually all historians believe that the Whigs and Democrats competed in elections, the disagreement emerges when considering how rigid these parties were and, therefore, how much they actually structured political behavior and ideas.

²³ Some critics may dismiss Van Buren's dialectical format as simply a mechanism to historically align the Democratic Party as the rightful heir of Jefferson's legacy. While this may be true to a degree, it is unlikely. Van Buren's sons edited and published this inquiry posthumously, nearly a decade after his death. If Van Buren wrote the inquiry simply to bolster Democratic support, it is odd that he would become a Free Soil candidate and would fail to publish his writings; Van Buren, *Inquiry into the Origins and Course of Political Parties in the United States*, pgs. 7-8, 11; James Madison, "Federalist No. 10," in *The Federalist Papers*. Originally Published November 23, 1787.

²⁴ Alexander H Stephens, *A Constitutional View of the Late War Between the States*. Vol. 1. (Philadelphia, PA: National Publishing Company, 1868) pg. 444.

²⁵ Stephens was writing to persuade the general public that compact theory, however, his work helps explain how he, an ardent Whig, switched parties twice before the Confederacy. See also Shelden & Alexander's similar case study of Salmon P Chase; Shelden & Alexander. "Dismantling the Party System: Party Fluidity and the Mechanisms of Nineteenth-Century U.S. Politics."; Thus, it is odd when historians and social scientists say that the idea of a party system miraculously appeared in the mid-twentieth century when a century earlier, Van Buren was very clearly sketching out what a party system was and ought to be and how those systems ensured stability of the political process. Shelden and Alexander paint party systems as a modern invention that has corrupted how historians discuss 19th century political history. While the party system was more fluid than the hyper-partisanship of the early 21st century, it was about as fluid as the American party system in the mid to late 20th century wherein various wings of parties broke off to form their own entities (briefly, e.g. the American Party, the Constitution Party). Thus, Shelden and Alexander castigate the idea of a party system as presentist while engaging in the very presentism they abhor by allowing the polarization of their contemporary era to cloud their idea of party as a rigid force that individuals must obey; Graham Peck, "Was There a Second Party System? Illinois as a Case Study in Antebellum Politics," in *Practicing Democracy: Popular Politics in the United States from the Constitution to the Civil War*, editors Daniel Peart & Adam I.P. Smith (Charlottesville, VA: The University of Virginia Press, 2015) 145-170; Shelden &

Within the school of thought that holds that the SPS did exist, there are some key historians.²⁶ Most notably is Richard McCormick, whose seminal work *The Second American Party System* greatly influenced the field of political history.²⁷ McCormick conducted a qualitative comparative study of the SPS within each and every state and found that while the SPS largely developed due to pre-existing factions that lacked coherent ideology and were largely personalized, the SPS structure created notable differences between the parties.²⁸ Thomas Silbey employed quantitative methods of roll call vote records at the federal level and found substantive differences in both voting patterns and ideology between the two parties.²⁹ Thomas Brown went even further, asserting that the most basic and fundamental cleavage underpinning every political debate was the role of the federal government.³⁰ More recently, historians in the new school of New Political History combined social, cultural, and political history to find that

Alexander. "Dismantling the Party System: Party Fluidity and the Mechanisms of Nineteenth-Century U.S. Politics." 420.

²⁶ Horace Montgomery, *Cracker Parties*. (Baton Rouge, LA: Louisiana State University Press, 1950); Murray, *The Whig Party in Georgia*.

²⁷ Richard P McCormick, *The Second American Party System*. New York City: W.W. Norton & Co, 1966.

²⁸ In Georgia, these personalized factions were the Clark and Troup groups; Because state and federal politicians used the SPS parties as political vehicles, those vehicles began to become associated with particular perspectives and viewpoints. As the political class shuffled and turned over, these labels and the ideologies they carried remained and influenced a new political class. McCormick, *The Second American Party System*.

²⁹ Notably, of course, is Silbey's focus on federal politics. While federal politics played an increasingly important role, especially after the Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo, state parties still dominated political considerations for the populace. Especially in the South but also in the Midwest, voters saw federal elections as opportunities to head off burgeoning federal power (this dynamic of federalism existed in American since its inception but the nullification crisis in the Jackson administration helped substantially shape the successive party system, although state idiosyncrasies still dominated [e.g. South Carolina was a one party, Democratic state despite the Democratic party largely supporting Jackson in the crisis] or to protect their own interests (e.g. slavery, but one must of course note that states' rights rebels saw little difference between federal overreach and the slavery issue [on this issue especially, ideology bent to material interests as the 1850 Fugitive Slave Act and the Dred Scott decision stripped states of any semblance of popular sovereignty or state power]); Joel H Silbey, *The Shrine of Party: Congressional Voting Behavior, 1841-1852*, (Pittsburgh, PA: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1967) 80-82, 146; Charles Sellers, "Who Were the Southern Whigs." *The American Historical Review* Vol. 59, No. 2 (Jan, 1954) 346.

³⁰ Brown held that whereas Democrats embraced a populist viewpoint of government wherein government should respect the *true wishes* of the people and should do more to empower them by getting out of their way and respecting their rights, Whigs saw the government as an able vehicle to improve the surrounding community and placed the common good above their own material interest. This conceptual cleavage, while enticing, is unlikely, especially in Georgia. The base of Whig voters was in the Black belt. It is, therefore, no surprise that these Southern Whigs abandoned the party en masse; Anthony Gene Carey, *Parties Slavery, and the Union in Antebellum Georgia*, (Athens, GA: The University of Georgia Press, 1997); Thomas Brown, "Whigs and the Politics of Statesmanship, 1833-1841." *The Journal of Southern History* Vol. 46, No. 3 (Aug. 1980) 361-280.

the SPS existed.³¹ Importantly, Jeffrey Pasley held that party systems in the Early Republic and Antebellum periods were notably different than those of later eras as they were personalized, localized, and idiosyncratic to the voters themselves.³² While Pasley states that party systems did exist, the intimate nature of the contemporary political culture necessarily molded national ideas to lower-ballot elections' and political institutions' electoral needs.

Conversely, some historians believe that the SPS did not really exist. This school is most prominent in Southern historians who see a regional cleavage of North and South as the primary division rather than an ideological difference.³³ Michael Holt, a titan and founder of the school of New Political History, saw parties as simply electoral vehicles to win elections. Thus, these parties lacked an ideological platform and backbone.³⁴ Historian Dr. Rachel Shelden, Holt's student, used Salmon P Chase's party fluidity to show how party distinctions were nominal rather than substantive.³⁵

Only when federal issues began to dominate the political conversation following the Mexican American War did the SPS begin to collapse wholesale. Thus, the SPS was a method of ideological alignment wherein political actors with similar ideals could cooperate to achieve their

³¹ Dr. Rosemarie Zagari's work is an excellent example of the modern fusion of the lenses of race, gender, class, and politics within historical analysis; Rosemarie Zagari, "Women and Party Conflict in the Early Republic," in *Beyond the Founders: New Approaches to the Political History of the Early American Republic*, edited by Jeffrey L. Pasley et. al (Chapel Hill, NC: The University of North Carolina Press, 2002) pgs. 107-128.

³² Jeffrey Pasley, "The Cheese and the Words: Popular Political Culture and Participatory Democracy in the Early American Republic," in *Beyond the Founders: New Approaches to the Political History of the Early American Republic*, edited by Jeffrey L. Pasley et. al (Chapel Hill, NC: The University of North Carolina Press, 2002) pgs. 31-56.

³³ Ulrich B Phillips, *Georgia and State Rights*, (Washington D.C: Government Printing Office, 1902) 145; John M. Sacher, "The Sudden Collapse of the Louisiana Whig Party," *The Journal of Southern History* Vol 65, No. 2 (May 1999). Paul Murray, "Party Organization in Georgia Politics 1825-1853," *The Georgia Historical Quarterly* Vol. 29, No. 4 (Dec. 1945) 195-210; Charles S. Snyder, *The Development of Southern Sectionalism, 1819-1848*, (Baton Rouge, LA: Louisiana State Press, 1948).

³⁴ Michael F. Holt, "The Mysterious Disappearance of the American Whig Party," in Michael F. Holt, *Political Parties and American Political Development from the Age of Jackson to the Age of Lincoln* (Baton Rouge, LA: Louisiana State University Press, 1992), 262-264.

³⁵ Shelden & Alexander. "Dismantling the Party System: Party Fluidity and the Mechanisms of Nineteenth-Century U.S. Politics."

goals. When the SPS accomplished its goal of nationalizing politics, it could no longer paper over the massive divide between national and individual state interests. In Georgia, for example, the Whig party disposed of John Berrien for trying to negotiate with Calhounites and keep sectional ties low. A few years later, Berrien's chief expulsor (Alexander Stephens) would himself serve as the floor manager for the Compromise of 1850.³⁶ Thus, the SPS did exist but created its own undoing. Because Van Buren had used the spoils system to entice wily states to adopt the practice, he had not attracted good republicans, but rather, enterprising individuals who sought personal glory over the common good. Even worse, good republicans could not win (or hold office for long) as the Georgian populace grew tired of an expansionary federal government and longed for the days when Georgia-centered parties dominated.³⁷ Elected politicians had to be a Janus-headed hydra, spouting Georgian separatism to win elections and then trying to bridge gaps within the capitol to pass necessary legislation and wield political power.³⁸

Georgia Political Contexts

Georgia, as with any state, had a unique political development between the founding and the advent of the SPS. In the early republic, republicanism largely dominated, with parties and even person-based factions not really existing.³⁹ This changed in the 1820s when a political cleavage between George M Troup and John Clark developed, largely due to personal ties with various settler groups. This cleavage, however, disintegrated in the face of Jacksonian Democracy and the dialectic shifted from Jackson to the Union itself in the 1836 election.

³⁶ Murray, *The Whig Party in Georgia*, 134

³⁷ Murray, *The Whig Party in Georgia*, 176.

³⁸ Ibid, 135-136.

³⁹ Eugene Carey's *Parties, Slavery, and the Union in Antebellum Georgia*, is the eminent work on Georgian political development. It incorporates demography relevant for electoral statistics but fails to adequately explain Georgia political institutions and also fails to recognize that federal legislators from Georgia necessarily employed different strategies than the state. Carey over emphasizes the role and power of central federal figures such as Alexander Stephens, Robert Toombs, Howell Cobb, and John Berrien (a central Whig figure within Georgia itself) on occasion; Carey, *Parties Slavery, and the Union in Antebellum Georgia*, 306.

Curiously, this dedication to states' rights precluded the anti-Democratic faction in Georgia from attending the first Whig convention in 1839 as it was in the North and states' rights proponents were skeptical of national ties.⁴⁰ With the risk of losing Georgia's power in the Union, the party expelled Calhounites⁴¹ and aligned itself with the Whigs.⁴² The SPS had arrived in Georgia.⁴³

As with any national party system, Georgia politicians and voters shaped the SPS to their interests and needs. Thus, while there was a stark policy difference between national Whigs and Democrats regarding tariffs and trade, no party could win in Georgia on a pro-tariff platform.⁴⁴ Moreover, national politicians such as Martin Van Buren or Zachary Taylor could only be successful in Georgia if they seemed to exist above the political fray. That is, republican ideals still dominated in Georgia (even if they were rarely practiced) and Georgia voters felt most comfortable voting for candidates that were not party hacks or scheming politicians but rather wanted simply to do the right thing.⁴⁵ The SPS, like most party systems, was a mechanism of organization and shorthand in Georgia.

Antebellum Georgian political institutions were in flux. As Jacksonian democracy swept through Georgia, its institutions necessarily democratized. First, the governorship shifted from selection via the legislature to popular election in 1825. Second, legislators for the federal House

⁴⁰ Ibid, 20, 30-32, 46-47.

⁴¹ Calhounites fiercely supported states' rights and were called as such because they supported the state sovereignty doctrine of Calhoun.

⁴² Paul Murray makes a compelling case that Martin Van Buren's spoils system (built on the dialectic format Van Buren forwards in his discussion of the SPS) actually motivated anti-Jacksonians to align with the national parties for fear of being shut out. This is especially important when considering that the fragmentation in party leadership in the late 1840s and early 1850s was largely driven by personal gain. Thus, it makes sense that the political class resulting from this system was self-interested as the entire subscription to the SPS rested on the notion of individual gain and appointments in addition to ensuring that Georgia remained within the national attention and discourse; Carey, *Parties Slavery, and the Union in Antebellum Georgia*, 49; Murray, *The Whig Party in Georgia*.

⁴³ While the Whig party in Georgia essentially collapsed following the Compromise of 1850, the parties did not recongeal until 1855. For example, in *The Federal Union* and *The Southern Recorder* party identities reverted to Whig and Democrat in the 1853 election discourse; *The Federal Union*. Milledgeville, GA; *Southern Recorder*. Milledgeville, GA.

⁴⁴ Carey, *Parties Slavery, and the Union in Antebellum Georgia*, 63.

⁴⁵ Carey, *Parties Slavery, and the Union in Antebellum Georgia*, 90.

of Representatives began to use the district system of election in 1844. This ensured that both parties would have a pool of politicians and that each region of Georgia could elect at least one representative of their choice whereas the prior legislature-led selection ensured a one-party delegation. Third, Georgians amended the state constitution in 1851 to allow for the election of lower and superior circuit judges, further devolving power. Finally, in 1861, Georgia adopted a new constitution that largely crystalized and expanded upon these Democratizing trends, instituting universal trial by jury and requiring the popular election of even more state executives.⁴⁶ Thus, over the antebellum period, the Georgia state government devolved its power, empowered its various regions, and sought protections for slavery.⁴⁷

Georgian legislative political institutions within the scope of this study (1845-1854) are essential for understanding decision makers' actions. The Georgia legislature was a bicameral system with an upper house, the Senate, and a lower house, the House of Representatives. There were 130 representatives in the lower house,⁴⁸ with each county having at least one representative and thirty seven counties with larger populations having two.⁴⁹ In the Senate, there were forty seven senators, with each district being comprised of two contiguous counties (per 1843 boundaries).⁵⁰ Thus, it makes sense why the Senate was usually more Democratic (strength

⁴⁶ State of Georgia, "Georgia Constitution of 1861." *University of Georgia Law School*.

⁴⁷ The growing importance of regions was a mutually enforcing cycle of greater democratization and greater devolution. As the government granted counties more political power, a new political class with arose with their foundation in devolution. This new political class then argued for greater devolution and the cycle continued. In antebellum Georgia, region and county were the best predictor of voting patterns, trumping economic and racial compositions. Thus, region/county was a clear cleavage underlying the SPS in Georgia; Carey, *Parties Slavery, and the Union in Antebellum Georgia*; DeBats, *Elites and Masses*.

⁴⁸ *Journal of the House of Representatives of the State of Georgia, 1845; Journal of the House of Representatives of the State of Georgia, 1847; Journal of the House of Representatives of the State of Georgia, 1849&1850; Journal of the House of Representatives of the State of Georgia, 1851&1852; Journal of the House of Representatives of the State of Georgia, 1853&1854.*

⁴⁹ Because Georgia used the 3/5s rule for apportionment, Whig interests were overrepresented and given even more power in the House; State of Georgia, "Georgia Constitution of 1798 as amended through 1849" *University of Georgia Law School*.

⁵⁰ Except for a handful of populous counties that had their own senator; State of Georgia, "Georgia Constitution of 1798 as amended through 1849"; Carey, *Parties Slavery, and the Union in Antebellum Georgia*, 125.

in rural representation and the frontier) while the House was more Whiggish.⁵¹ Senators had to be at least twenty-five years old, a citizen for nine years, a Georgian for three years, and have an estate worth \$500 or property worth \$1000.⁵² Representatives had to be at least twenty-one, a citizen for nine years, a Georgian for three years, and have an estate worth \$250 or property worth \$500. Following an 1839 amendment, legislators were elected every other year and convened accordingly. Both houses were elected biennially on the first Monday of October of odd numbered years.

Passing a bill in the legislature was somewhat tenuous as it required three separate readings on three separate days in each chamber. After the bill's introduction and first reading, it was referred to a committee for deliberation. If the bill made it out of committee, a committee report was read that recommended a specific action (pass, reject, amend) and the bill went through a second reading on the legislature floor wherein legislators could propose various amendments.⁵³ Finally, the bill went through a third reading where legislators could either support it or reject it. If the chamber passed the bill, it went to the other chamber and repeated the same three-vote process. Although antebellum Georgia had a relatively weak governor, the governor still had vetoing power that the legislature could overrule with a two-thirds majority.⁵⁴ Any constitutional amendment required two consecutive legislatures' approval via a two-thirds

⁵¹ Institutions also added to this divide as the Whiggish House of Representatives also had to initiate spending bills. Whigs, because they were richer on average and paid most of the state taxes, were willing to increase taxes for the sake of development and infrastructure whereas Democrats opposed such government power.

⁵² The average Southern artisan made around \$500 annually and nonskilled laborers earned around half that.. Thus, only the middle class and upper class could serve as political representatives; Robert Margo, *Wages and Labor Markets in the United States, 1820-1860*, (Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press, 2000), 45; State of Georgia, "Georgia Constitution of 1798 as amended through 1849."

⁵³ *Journal of the House of Representatives of the State of Georgia, 1845; Journal of the House of Representatives of the State of Georgia, 1847; Journal of the House of Representatives of the State of Georgia, 1849&1850; Journal of the House of Representatives of the State of Georgia, 1851&1852; Journal of the House of Representatives of the State of Georgia, 1853&1854.*

⁵⁴ Pocketing vetoing was proscribed by the Constitution. It is also worth noting that the legislator, rather than the governor, picked the leaders of the militia. Thus, there was a strong suspicion surrounding a centralized executive within the Georgian political culture; State of Georgia, "Georgia Constitution of 1798 as amended through 1849."

majority.⁵⁵ These were the obstacles facing legislators and party leadership as they tried to navigate and control the political sphere. The SPS streamlined this process by aligning and allying representative in the aggregate and by making committees more predictable with such a transient political class.

To better understand how the SPS shaped political discourse outside of governmental institutions, knowing which regions and people had political power is integral. The Georgian Constitution specified that eligible voters must be twenty-one years old, taxpayers, and have lived in the county they were voting in for at least six months.⁵⁶ As stated before, counties were usually pretty united politically, so local conventions and power struggles were very rare.⁵⁷ Thus, political discourse was primarily at the state and party levels. Newspapers were a key source of such political discourses as they, like all papers in the antebellum period, were intensely partisan. While few people had newspaper subscriptions (this was prior to the advent of the penny presses in the South), many people saw the papers' headlines and discussed politics with people at their local pubs, churches, and other third spaces.⁵⁸

Nominating candidates was somewhat of a give-and-take between political elites and the masses. Political elites used their influence, wealth, experience, connections, and status to sway other elites into supporting their preferred candidate. The people, however, limited this power by serving as an electoral check. If the party nominated someone the people would not accept, party loyalties were rarely strong enough to keep voters from defecting.⁵⁹ Moreover, elections were

⁵⁵ Ibid.

⁵⁶ The poorest Georgians could still vote provided they paid their poll tax come election time and were not in too much debt; Ibid.

⁵⁷ Carey, *Parties Slavery, and the Union in Antebellum Georgia*, 139.

⁵⁸ Ibid, 145

⁵⁹ Ibid, 139

very personalized and subject to rhetorical, alcoholic, and personal sway.⁶⁰ While county elections were largely ceremonial, biennial state conventions established policy and platforms for elections and legislative sessions. Thus, the SPS was more a tool of political elites to organize themselves for the public; however, the public recognized these labels and understood how to use them in an electoral fashion to express favor or dissent at contemporary policies.⁶¹

There were six key structures at play in the Georgian political ecosystem. First, underlying all political activities was a sense of republicanism and honor culture. Many Georgians had a special reverence for a class of politicians who would put the common good above themselves. Thus, the Georgia political class (an endangered breed) always hearkened to civic virtue and the common man. Additionally, honor culture played a major role in political discourse itself. Greenberg's somewhat quixotic article about nose-pulling shows how many Southerners saw politics as an extension of themselves and their values.⁶² Thus, Georgia voters wanted a government that would respect their honor by protecting their rights and staying out of their way and Georgia politicians wanted a government that they could use to enact their political will while still maintaining their honor. This is especially important considering the horse-trading and political maneuvering following the Compromise of 1850.⁶³

⁶⁰ Gene Carey's book cites a tale of Jacob Martin, a humble yeoman farmer who convinced the people to vote for him by pointing to his profitable and well-tended estate as evidence for his work ethic; Ibid, 127.

⁶¹ Carey notes how the public grew tired of this *two-party system*, especially in counties wherein one party was uncompetitive. This seems to be less of an aspect of the SPS in Georgia and more of a common experience across America with its strong tradition of distrusting political elites and political apathy; Ibid, 141-142.

⁶² This notion of nose pulling was necessarily intersected with morality because prevailing ideas about phrenology and physiognomy of the time saw the nose as the primary indicator of a person's moral compass. Of course, there is the example of Bully Brooks and martyr Charles Sumner at the front of the American ethos, but such examples permeate American history from this period; Greenberg, "The Nose, the Lie, and the Duel in the Antebellum South."; Rachel Walker, "Facing Race: Popular Science and Black Intellectual Thought in Antebellum America." *Early American Studies: An Interdisciplinary Journal* Vol. 19, No. 3 (Summer 2021): 601-640.

⁶³ Eminent historian David Potter calls this instead the Armistice of 1850. While catchy, it is obvious that the party mechanisms worked well enough for the bill to pass. So, while the Compromise or Armistice can be seen as a precursor to the Civil War, it is more accurately, the acme of the SPS; Potter & Fehrenbacher, *The Impending Crisis, 1848-1861*.

A second structure was regional. William DeBats's quantitative analysis of Georgia in the Antebellum period reasonably asserts that region was an adequate predictor of elections.⁶⁴ While it is easy to project the contemporary urban vs rural political divide onto the past, antebellum Georgia was much more nuanced. Because regions were settled at different times and by different groups with different motives, they show more of a class divide than one of geography.⁶⁵ To win, both parties needed to rack up votes in their home counties, make inroads in the middle of the state, and cut down the majorities in their opponent's stronghold (mountainous northwest for the Democrats, the Cotton belt running across the midsection of the state for the Whigs). Thus, throughout the political culture existed this constant pull for both the yeoman farmer and the planter aristocrat. Industrialization, although slight, introduced a third type of voter into the system: the proletarian.

During the later antebellum period, Georgia (like the rest of America) was in the thralls of the Market Revolution. Like other Southern states, Georgia's Market Revolution centered on ease of capital for the agricultural sector and industrial development. Most importantly, this economic development created a new class of people. Augusta and Columbus had a growing a textile industry and other population hubs began to see an influx of investment.⁶⁶ While it is easy to simply state that this industrialization was largely an urban phenomenon, the frontier also began to embrace mechanization and labor.⁶⁷ Regionalism heavily intersected virtually all issues,

⁶⁴ DeBats, *Elites and Masses*, 378, 384.

⁶⁵ Although, one should note that the age old rule of hill-people (people who live in the mountains or are separated from the center by geography) vote differently than the lowlands largely holds as the Democratic stronghold in Georgia was in the mountain counties in the northwest; Carey, *Parties Slavery, and the Union in Antebellum Georgia*; DeBats, *Elites and Masses*, 378;

⁶⁶ Cities wherein there was a larger foreign-born population formed the backbone of Know-Nothingism in Georgia. The primary determinant of industrialization was if the railroad came to town. Thus, infrastructure debates were heavily influenced by regional differences; Montgomery, *Cracker Parties*, 154; David F Weiman, "Farmers and the Market in Antebellum America: A View from the Georgia Upcountry." *The Journal of Economic History* Vol. 47, No. 3 (Sep. 1987) 627-647; Richard W Griffin, "The Augusta (Georgia) Manufacturing Company in Peace, War, and Reconstruction." *The Business History Review* Vol. 32, No. 1 (Spring 1958): 60-73.

⁶⁷ Weiman, "Farmers and the Market in Antebellum America: A View from the Georgia Upcountry."

but especially development as Georgia's primary cash crops (cotton and rice) were the first destinations of the railroad.⁶⁸ Rural areas had to supplement (or entirely replace) external capital with local sources to build the necessary infrastructure for development.⁶⁹ Furthermore, the Market Revolution's focus on profit coupled with the sprawling transportation infrastructure meant that many farmers who previously focused on food stuffs to pivot to cotton. This pivot only augmented the impetus for more manufacturing in the South.⁷⁰ Many poor whites saw factories and industries as an able means to earn the income they needed to become the ideal independent yeoman.⁷¹ Thus, despite a material cleavage between cotton growers, food stuff farmers, and proletarians, the ideal of independent landowners remained a common ideal that all legislators and individuals advocated and worked toward.

Another cleavage that girded the political system without necessarily translating into direct electoral results was religion. There were very few non-Protestants in antebellum Georgia.⁷² Despite the apparent absence of political voting behavior primarily based in religion, denominational differences were always in the back of Georgians' minds.⁷³ For example, in the revivals that were aftershocks of the Second Great Awakening, Georgian papers commented on how conciliatory and courteous Methodists, Baptists, and Presbyterians were to one another.⁷⁴

⁶⁸ DeBats, *Elites and Masses*, 365.

⁶⁹ Weiman, "Farmers and the Market in Antebellum America: A View from the Georgia Upcountry."

⁷⁰ Hence why the two biggest textile industries are in the heart of the cotton growing centers but industry began to expand to other cities in the upcountry [e.g. mills in Douglas County]. Marc Egnal's materialist study of the Civil War attempts to show how grain producing counties in Northern Georgia were opposed to the interests of the cotton growers in the Black Belt (171 & 269). Put simply, this makes little sense (at least in the Georgia case) considering that there was an active shift towards cotton from the food stuff producers. Additionally, these food stuff farmers were also ardent state's rights men. While there was a pocket of Unionists in the northeast (per the 1852 presidential election), this was somewhat of a passing fancy as this same area voted for Breckenridge in 1860 by huge margins.

⁷¹ Tom E Terril, Edmond Ewing, & Pamela White. "Eager Hands: Labor for Southern Textiles, 1850-1860." *The Journal of Economic History* Vol. 36, No. 1 (Mar 1976): 87.

⁷² There were 1,862 churches in the 1850 census. There were 879 Baptist, 795 Methodist, 97 Presbyterian, 30 Unionist, 20 Anglican, and 8 Catholic. In terms of population, 51% was Baptist, 38% Methodist, 7% Presbyterian, and the rest comprised less than 1%; DeBats, *Elites and Masses*, 355.

⁷³ *Ibid*, 357-358.

⁷⁴ This would seem an odd commentary if religious differences were simply nominal rather than substantive; *Ibid*, 274.

Moreover, political parties tried to make inroads into regions by stressing the religiosity of their candidate.⁷⁵ If a candidate was a Methodist Whig, party stumpers would use that denomination to relate to the Democratic counties in the north which were Methodist bastions. Finally, the presence of religion is obvious. While this paper focuses on the acme and disintegration of the SPS, one of the resulting parties was a temperance party based in Methodist principles by a Methodist preacher. This is especially key because when party systems fail, politicians immediately fall back on societal cleavages to form new ones.⁷⁶ Thus, that one party (even if it only garnered 8% of the vote) based itself on Methodist morality and temperance (in a non-Xenophobic way) shows a religious cleavage at play.

Race was also an essential structure underpinning the Georgian system. Georgia was a slave state, but it had outlawed the domestic slave trade in the early 19th century.⁷⁷ Enslaved people constituted around 40% of the Georgian population and were largely centered in the middle region of the state around the Cotton Belt.⁷⁸ Like many other Southern states, Georgia was terrified of slave revolts and black agency. Thus, in the late 1840s and early 1850s, legislators proposed bills intended to reopen the slave trade (foreign and domestic) and pile enough taxes onto the small free Black community to force them to migrate.⁷⁹ Moreover, the infamous Georgia platform and the Armistice of 1850 rested on the key pillar that Northerners would capture runaway slaves.⁸⁰ While slaveholders themselves constituted a small minority of

⁷⁵ Ibid, 274.

⁷⁶ History is replete with such examples (e.g the Populist Party, the Progressive Party, Plaid Cymru); Montgomery, *Cracker Parties*, 135.

⁷⁷ Of course, the international slave trade was outlawed. Georgia statutes simply barred slave traders from other states from operating within Georgia. Thus, slaves were more expensive in Georgia because one had to factor in transportation costs. This became a key cleavage in the political realm as it was seen as a barrier to social mobility.

⁷⁸ Carey, *Parties Slavery, and the Union in Antebellum Georgia*, 4.

⁷⁹ *Journal of the House of Representatives of the State of Georgia, 1845*, 132; *Journal of the House of Representatives of the State of Georgia, 1849&1850*, 409; *Journal of the House of Representatives of the State of Georgia, 1851&1852*, 801.

⁸⁰ Murray, *The Whig Party in Georgia*, 156-157.

voters in Georgia, because of the Market Revolution in the South, enterprising individuals saw slavery as a vital institution for their social ascension.⁸¹ As Georgians thought about the future and future expansion, they all agreed that the Native Americans must be expelled or extirpated. Thus, race, in its various forms, underpinned the key issue of development.⁸² Moreover, Alexander Stephens's infamous Cornerstone speech well explained the prevailing ideas about race, slavery, and the future in Georgia.⁸³

Gender structures also influenced legislator behavior in this period.⁸⁴ First, American society was in flux regarding gender. The Seneca Falls convention occurred in 1848. Concurrently, Catharine Beecher's *Treatise on Domestic Economy for the Use of Young Ladies at Home and School*, while published in 1841, was actively disseminating into the American cores and peripheries.⁸⁵ Second, because of the development of the separate spheres doctrine, republican motherhood was shifting from that of educated women to raise a new ruling class into that of stronger women with their own domain (the home).⁸⁶ Whereas society previously saw women as moral educators, now, their domain only extended to the home. Thus, moral education was now firmly within men's domain, namely that of politics. Third, states began to dismantle

⁸¹ While some may ask if the Market Revolution really sparked this method of social mobility, it is likely that the Market Revolution simply amplified and reshaped this preexisting structure. Whereas the drive to be self-sufficient had always existed within the yeomen, the Market Revolution introduced the notion of ever-expanding profits. Previously, yeoman would have been content to have a sector of land and make a decent living (the value of leisure), the Market Revolution demonetized leisure and shifted status to profit. Thus, to socially ascend, one could no longer be independent: they must be ever more profitable. *Ibid*, 177

⁸² *Ibid*, 193

⁸³ H Cleveland, *Alexander Stephens, in Public and Private: With Letters and Speeches, Before, During, and Since the War*. Philadelphia, PA: National Publishing, 1866) 717-29.

⁸⁴ Virtually every political historian who has written on antebellum Georgia has ignored the gendered aspects of the era. While gender history is a relatively new field and lens within history, even recent works ignore gender. For example, Carey states that gender was a static structure in antebellum America and was not a topic of legislation. This is patently false as legislators proposed laws relating to divorce, feme sole coverture status, and morality (thought to be within the female sphere). Carey, *Parties Slavery, and the Union in Antebellum Georgia*, xxi.

⁸⁵ Catharine Beecher, *A Treatise on Domestic Economy: For the use of Young Ladies at Home and at School*, (New York City, Harper & Brothers, 1845).

⁸⁶ Linda Kerber, "Republican Mothers and Women Citizens," in *Women's America: Refocusing the Past*. 9th edition. Linda Kerber et. al editors. (New York City: Oxford University Press, 2020), 96.

property restrictions of married women. In 1848, New York passed a law allowing for married women to keep *feme sole* property (personal property). Mississippi followed suit. Fourth, laws surrounding divorce were becoming more fluid. Divorcers and divorcees could remarry, for instance.⁸⁷ The legal restrictions surrounding the status of divorced people were also disappearing.⁸⁸ Within Georgia, there was an active battle between the legislature that sought to place divorce power into the hands of juries and the Supreme Court which sought to make divorce difficult and rare.⁸⁹ These trends are directly evident in Georgia as legislators began to propose laws that liberalized divorce, gave bills of attainder for *feme sole* status, and governed certain moral institutions like gambling and libations.⁹⁰ While marriage restrictions occupied an odd space, other familial institutions were firmly within the female purview.⁹¹

Following the 1850 Compromise and perceived inexorable Northern perturbation, the SPS in Georgia collapsed.⁹² Rather than the two traditional parties opposing each other (Democrats and Whigs), party leaders from both of the old parties constructed the Southern Rights and Union parties. This split the Whigs completely as they had a legacy of being a State's Rights party but now were much more Unionist. The Democrats largely sided with the Unionist party. Thus, it is no shock that the Union party won handedly because the opposition was half of a former party. This did not necessarily spell the end of the SPS in the moment, however, as is

⁸⁷ Loren Schweninger, *Families in Crisis in the Old South: Divorce, Slavery, and the Law*, (Chapel Hill, NC: University of North Carolina Press, 2012) pg. 2.

⁸⁸ The social judgement remained though.

⁸⁹ Julie Rocheton, "Divorce, Civil Code, and Common Law: The Case of Nineteenth-Century United States," *GLOSSAE. European Journal of Legal History*, 21 (2024), pg. 703.

⁹⁰ *Journal of the House of Representatives of the State of Georgia, 1845*, 374; *Journal of the House of Representatives of the State of Georgia, 1847*, 168; *Journal of the House of Representatives of the State of Georgia, 1849&1850*, 617; *Journal of the House of Representatives of the State of Georgia, 1851&1852*, 302, 598;

⁹¹ Legislatures sought to excise themselves from marriage decisions (especially in Georgia) however, the fear of polygamy and other depredations kept many legislators attentive to marriage structures. Thus, while it was an institution within the female domain, its public aspect and patriarchal nature necessarily included men and, therefore, lawmaking; Schweninger, *Families in Crisis in the Old South: Divorce, Slavery, and the Law*, pg. 6

⁹² Montgomery, *Cracker Parties*.

evident when in the following 1853 election, newspapers used Whig and Democrat to denote party label again.⁹³ While this project recognizes the importance of the collapse of the SPS in the 1855 election (Know Nothingism replaced Whiggery), the enduring rate of incumbency within the chamber (around 30%) along with these fluid ties entails that tracing behavior is the best way to truly understand party workings rather than labels.

Methodology & Case Study Selection

This project relies on both quantitative and qualitative methods for documenting and explaining behavior. This research quantitatively evaluates recorded yea and nay votes for the Georgia state legislature in all sessions between 1845 and 1854.⁹⁴ Due to time constraints, this project will necessarily use a sample instead of all of the House of Representatives roll call votes to be calculated at the 95% confidence interval.⁹⁵ To evaluate this data, this project uses the statistical program R to perform logistic regressions.⁹⁶ To establish party allegiances, the project

⁹³ *Southern Recorder*. Milledgeville, GA; *The Federal Union*, Milledgeville, GA.

⁹⁴ These records, like any, are flawed. Thus, they do not perfectly encapsulate voting behavior. For example, name misspellings frequently leave votes unattributable. For example, in the 1853, there were two legislators with the last name Arnold. In the votes, Arnold is only recorded with an initial occasionally with it. Thus, it is impossible to know which Arnold the record refers to. Moreover, the journals forgot to list county representatives or added in new names with little explanation. Despite this research's best efforts, newspapers and other political memorabilia have been unable to provide information for these new names or missing counties. Additionally, some political scientists grow weary at roll call votes as they can be misleading as to what the party position actually is. While true to some degree, it would be odd for so many of the recorded votes to be public stunts. Usually, those that are exceedingly obvious. For example, Democrats occasionally tried to hang a carving of Andrew Jackson in the House chamber and took a roll call vote for approval. This was very obviously performative and a party test for the newspapers. Most bills that a legislator requested the yeas and nays for, however, were more menial or used as documentation for campaigning. Thus, this vote selection should give an over representative cross section of those issues wherein the parties had internal disagreements, offering additional insight into the SPS in Georgia. Clifford J Carrubba, et al. "Off the Record: Unrecorded Legislative Votes, Selection Bias and Roll-Call Vote Analysis." *British Journal of Political Science* Vol. 36, No. 4 (Oct. 2006) 691-704; *Journal of the House of Representatives of the State of Georgia, 1845*; *Journal of the House of Representatives of the State of Georgia, 1847*; *Journal of the House of Representatives of the State of Georgia, 1849&1850*; *Journal of the House of Representatives of the State of Georgia, 1851&1852*; *Journal of the House of Representatives of the State of Georgia, 1853&1854*.

⁹⁵ The project does not randomly select votes. Instead, it examines all of the votes in the session and prefers those that substantially mattered rather than procedural or ceremonial votes. For example, the project would document a vote on raising taxes on free Blacks but would not document each and every time the legislature held a vote to approval medical leave for a representative. For the sessions, the number of samples are as follows: 1845:100; 1847:100; 1849: 160; 1851: 150; 1853:100.

⁹⁶ Additionally, this project also uses some functional functions to facilitate calculations and data representation (rollcall, tidyverse, reshape2, igraph, ggraph, rundown, and readxl).

will use the election editions of the *Milledgeville Recorder* and *The Federal Union*.⁹⁷ This project also sorts votes between fifteen baskets.⁹⁸ Thus, the resulting statistical analysis reveals both aggregate party unity as well as party cohesion within specific policy debates. This methodology, therefore, measures overall party unity and traces which specific issues unraveled the SPS in Georgia.

Logistic regressions allow for a better measurement of correlation within a binary system. The project, therefore, uses this format with other variables expressed below to see which best explain the political behavior. These variables will be region, incumbency, political power (membership within committees and the party), county population, slave population within the county, the margin of victory, frontier status, the agricultural divide between yeoman and plantation owners, and the principal crop of a county. These characterizations will largely rely on election returns (as reported in the *Federal Union* and the *Milledgeville Recorder*), the legislative record, and the 1850 Georgia census. William DeBats's examination of the political voting behavior of the populace found that Georgians largely voted in blocks according to region and

⁹⁷ *The Federal Union* was Democratic and *The Southern Recorder* was pro-Whig and states' rights. *The Federal Union*. Milledgeville, GA; *Southern Recorder*. Milledgeville, GA.

⁹⁸ The fifteen baskets are:

1. Senator elections, federal relations, and secession;
2. Banking
3. Race
4. Family, gender, and morality
5. Railroads
6. Elections and democratization
7. Bills of attainder and pardons
8. Legislative procedure and adjournment
9. Taxes
10. Legal rights and judicial procedure
11. Business, licensure, and charters
12. Internal development, public lands, and land rights
13. County boundary alterations and local relations
14. State Capital changes
15. Miscellaneous

assigned them as such.⁹⁹ This project will use his pentasectional format of Upper Georgia, the Old Cotton Belt, the New Cotton Belt, Wire Grass, and Coast Lands to both test his findings and explain legislator behavior.¹⁰⁰ The 1850 census will provide data for county white population, outright slave population, proportional slave population,¹⁰¹ religious affiliation,¹⁰² class (as derived by the average wealth per person in the county per the value of farms and farm equipment),¹⁰³ the divide between plantation owners and yeomen (as determined by the average amount of property each male owns), frontier status,¹⁰⁴ and the ratio of cash crops to foodstuffs.¹⁰⁵ For incumbency and county party history, the legislative record and post-election newspapers provide the requisite information.

Georgia is the ideal case study for such analysis for three reasons. First, Georgia had a true two party system wherein both Whigs and Democrats could reasonably expect to win and exercise power both at the state and the federal level.¹⁰⁶ This is especially important as most

⁹⁹ Donald A DeBats, *Elites and Masses: Political Structure, Communication, and Behavior in Antebellum Georgia*. (New York City: Garland Publishing, 1990) pg 378.

¹⁰⁰ One should note, errors abound in Debats's work. While some reviewers have mentioned some of the qualitative issues, Debats's very clearly did not analyze the legislative record as he incorrectly counts the number of measurable votes and uses derivative proxy variables that fail to accurately encapsulate the base variable in question (e.g. he uses the number of churches to state how religious a county is without accounting for transportation infrastructure, county age, or population); DeBats, *Elites and Masses*, 357; Phinizy Spalding, "Elites and Masses: Political Structure, Communication, and Behavior in Antebellum Georgia (review)," *Kent State University Press* Vol. 39, No. 2 (June 1993).

¹⁰¹ Proportion of the slave population divided by the white population.

¹⁰² Religious affiliation is derived by subtracting the aggregate accommodations of Baptist (B) churches (as the 1850 census establishes) from the aggregate accommodations of Methodist (M) churches and then dividing by the church population. $(\frac{M-B}{M+B})$; United States Census Bureau. *The Seventh Census of the United States, 1850: Georgia*.

Washington, D.C: U.S. Government, 1853. <https://www2.census.gov/library/publications/decennial/1850/1850a/1850-census-report-georgia.pdf>

¹⁰³ While this study's ignores Georgian industrialization, the state was largely agrarian. Industry centered in urban centers (rural factories were small operations). Thus, population metrics should account for this possible cleavage; George Rogers Taylor, *The Transportation Revolution, 1815-1860*. (Chicago, IL: Holt, Reinhart, & Winston, 1964).

¹⁰⁴ The ratio of improved land over unimproved land.

¹⁰⁵ One should also note that because this study measures political behavior in conjunction with food stuffs and cash crops, it tests Marc Egnal's materialistic thesis that the crops a county grew impact their secessionist predilections; Egnal, *Clash of Extremes: The Economic Origins of the Civil War*; United States Census Bureau. *The Seventh Census of the United States, 1850: Georgia*.

¹⁰⁶ Montgomery quoting *The Southern Banner*: "if there be any state in the union [Georgia] to which the maxim peculiarly applies, that 'no one can tell who is to be Governor until after election.'"; Montgomery, *Cracker Parties*,

contemporary literature on the SPS centers around states that one party very clearly dominated.¹⁰⁷

If a party has little reason to expect to regularly win and exercise power, it is more apt to extremism or adulteration. Thus, only when a party has a stake in power can it truly develop independent planks and platforms. Second, Georgia formed the backbone of Whiggery in the South. Georgia was the sole state in the Deep South that would reliably elect Whigs to both the federal House and Senate.¹⁰⁸ Moreover, within institutions, Georgia Whigs held positions of power because of their ability to sway fellow Southerners to support certain legislation.¹⁰⁹ Third, the Georgia legislative chambers had high turnover rates.¹¹⁰ Therefore, the political culture of the era lacked deep personal ties between political elites and rested almost entirely on ideology.¹¹¹ That being said, some veteran politicians remained. This project will, in addition to the basic party coherency tabulation, also note these politicians' ideological scores across sessions and describe continuities and changes.¹¹²

Banking

Banking was by far the biggest issue of the SPS and the biggest issue within Georgia's iteration of the SPS. Economic issues were the central concern of the SPS. Banking, because of

1.

¹⁰⁷ Huston, "The Illinois Political Realignment of 1844-1860: Revisiting the Analysis,"; Peck, "Was There a Second Party System? Illinois as a Case Study in Antebellum Politics,"; Matthias, "The Turbulent Years of Kentucky Politics, 1820-1850,"; Sacher, "The Sudden Collapse of the Louisiana Whig Party,"; Jeffrey, Thomas Edward. "The Second Party System in North Carolina, 1836-1860." (PhD Dissertation, The Catholic University of America, 1976); E Merlton Coulter, "The Downfall of the Whig Party in Kentucky," *Register of the Kentucky State Historical Society* Vol. 23, No. 68 (1925).

¹⁰⁸ Some may question if this competitive nature unnaturally skews the study's findings towards that of the SPS existing. Georgia was not a typical example of the SPS (if there were any). Many Georgian politicians wanted to remain outside of the SPS but had to adopt the dialectic to gain access to the spoils system. Thus, there is less fidelity to the system than in other states that attempted to better integrate into the national scheme. The fact that Georgia adopted the system and effectively implemented it speaks more to the power of the SPS and Van Buren rather than Georgia's idiosyncrasies.

¹⁰⁹ For example, Alexander Stephens's silver tongue and political maneuvering helped pass the Armistice of 1850; Potter & Fehrenbacher, *The Impending Crisis, 1848-1861*.

¹¹⁰ Carey, *Parties Slavery, and the Union in Antebellum Georgia*.

¹¹¹ Seats rarely changed party hands as county results were entirely predictable; Carey, *Parties Slavery, and the Union in Antebellum Georgia*, 308-309.

¹¹² Carey found that the party division between these experience politicians was roughly equal.

its importance to the economy, was frequently the first target on the American's people's radar. Thus, banks were the key issue of the Second Party System as they intersected with debates surrounding equality, development, infrastructure, and class. Nationally, the divide over the Second Bank in many ways created the SPS. Andrew Jackson vehemently opposed renewing the bank's charter for largely principled reasons. First, Jackson (and largely the Democracy) was suspicious of centralized authority. An unelected institution with elites that could bend the national economy to their will terrified Jackson and many Americans.¹¹³ Second, Jackson believed in the fallibility of men. While tangentially connected to his suspicion of authority (the everyman was just as qualified as bureaucrats to make decisions), this aspect of Democracy saw a centralized institution as a danger as when (not if) it eventually failed, it would drag the country down with it.¹¹⁴ Finally, Democracy was suspect of the emerging stock exchange and financial manipulators. Jackson embraced Jeffersonian Republicanism and while many Democrats saw banks as a necessary evil to foster development and offer scrip and credit, banks also allowed for complex financial institutions that could pull the wool over people's eyes. Put simply, emerging financial markets robbed people of agency, the bedrock of Democracy.¹¹⁵

Whigs saw banks as necessary for national progress, providing capital to businesses and agriculture, funding development, and issuing paper currency to accelerate growth rates¹¹⁶.

¹¹³ One should not misconstrue Jackson's position to be that of no government. Many Democrats wanted governments that were closer to the people to have more power regarding daily life. For example, virtually no opponents of Jacksonian tariffs argued for a laissez-faire economy. Rather, they recognized that government could (and should in other cases) protect business but saw the tariff as a tax on the South to enrich the North; Bray Hammond, *Banks and Politics in America: From the Revolution to the Civil War*, (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1957), pg. 328; Taylor, *The Transportation Revolution, 1815-1860*, 353.

¹¹⁴ Ironically, Jackson's extermination of the Second Bank helped usher in the Panic of 1837. When the Whigs pointed this out, Jackson simply responded that he was right all along and that the bank was a ticking timebomb; Sharon Ann Murphy, *Other People's Money: How Banking Worked in the Early American Republic*, (Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2017) 100-102.

¹¹⁵ Ibid, 82

¹¹⁶ Whigs revered public-private partnerships and saw collective action as the highest good that purified people and kept them in line. Moreover, Whigs were also a very future-oriented party, touting social mobility and progress. Thus, development and sustainable growth (usually in the form of a prudent pocketbook) were primary concerns for

Across the US, the Whig party frequently engaged in public-private partnerships with banks (primarily through charters) and opted for banking deregulation (largely in the form of lowering taxes on banks).¹¹⁷ Additionally, Whigs also wanted Georgia-chartered banks as they would be more accountable to the people, even going so far as to impose an 8% tax on banks in 1845 at the peak of Whig power.¹¹⁸ Whigs saw a strong central bank as an ideal venue to regulate smaller banks who over-issued currency. Moreover, banking and access to capital was an essential part of the emerging free-labor ideology centered around using market forces, grit, and will to ascend the social ladder.

Within Georgia, banking was a clear political divide. Planters and merchants relied on banks to finance their operations and extend credit.¹¹⁹ The Bank of the State of Georgia in Savannah was a prime example of the public-private partnership many states experimented with. Chartered in 1810, the bank offered credit and scrip, using the Georgia treasury and confidence in the state government for stability. The system was one of the most stable in the South.¹²⁰ By chartering the bank, the legislature could extend influence, using the carrot and stick of taxes to keep the bank in line. Because of this stability and the reliance on credit, there were few (if any) hard-money Democrats in the state.¹²¹ The banking issue was also heavily intertwined with the

the Whig party; Joseph W Pearson, *The Whigs' America: Middle-Class Political Thought in the Age of Jackson and Clay*, (Lexington, KY: The University of Kentucky Press, 2020), pgs. 72, 127-151; Murray, *The Whig Party in Georgia*, 112.

¹¹⁷ Although the Whig party may appear anti-Bank at first glance due to their killing of the state bank in 1841 and 1843 legislatures, this was a political maneuver following the Panic of 1837 rather than an ideological stand.

¹¹⁸ Murray, *The Whig Party in Georgia*, 122.

¹¹⁹ Howard Bodenhorn, *State Banking in Early America: A New Economic History*, (New York City: Oxford University Press, 2003), 223.

¹²⁰ This is, of course, relative as Georgia (like many other states) also struggled with bad actors issuing loads of paper scrip. This not only disrupted the economy but also undermined confidence in paper currency; Carole E Scott, "The Troubled World of Antebellum Banking in Georgia." *University of West Georgia* [faculty paper collections] (2016), pg 5; Carey, *Parties Slavery, and the Union in Antebellum Georgia*, 39.

¹²¹ Political partisans of both parties lambasted their opponents by saying how the public entanglement with the banks was a form of political bribery and machinery; ; hard-money Democrats distrusted paper currency so much they sought to abolish it and simply use bimetallic coinage; Scott, "The Troubled World of Antebellum Banking in Georgia," pg. 11; Carey, *Parties Slavery, and the Union in Antebellum Georgia*, 42.

issue of development as Whigs saw banking as the best venue to finance necessary developments and railroad companies could operate banks to finance themselves.¹²²

Railroads and Development

Georgia's coastline, fertile cotton lands, and relatively navigable rivers meant that the Transportation Revolution was key. Moreover, Georgia competed with South Carolina to keep Savannah a central port of the South rather than Charleston.¹²³ Building railroads and supporting foreign trade ensured this dominance. By facilitating cotton growing, transportation costs would become cheaper and profits in Georgia would be higher, theoretically enticing more capital into Georgia which would lead to an exponential cycle of growth. By the 1850s, Georgia had the best rails in the South. The completion of the state-funded Western & Atlantic rail in 1851 along with the growing connections with Chattanooga and the broader South gave Georgia the chance to pivot from growing food stuffs to growing more cash crops and importing food stuffs.¹²⁴

The politics of railroads was a potent issue within the Georgia legislature. Cotton interests sought improved and maintained tracks to facilitate their ride to the market. Farmers and communities took umbrage with monopolistic railroad companies that could trample over their common-law rights to waters and lands.¹²⁵ Even worse, railroad companies frequently received tax breaks or used a form of corvée labor.¹²⁶ Thus, farmers had to pay a tax for

¹²² Scott, "The Troubled World of Antebellum Banking in Georgia," pg. 7.

¹²³ Taylor, *The Transportation Revolution, 1815-1860*, 77.

¹²⁴ This was the prime example of how the Market Revolution occurred in the South: improve transportation infrastructure allowed fertile lands to be used for more valuable crops because food could be shipped into the region. Additionally, rice became more prevalent as it was a cash crop but could also be eaten in times of need. These cash crops' expansion encouraged greater industrialization in the South as these locations now had labor (both free and slave), transportation, and materials; Rice was an ideal cash crop to grow (where it could be grown) as it was valuable and could feed slaves in desperate times; Murray, *The Whig Party in Georgia*, 183.

¹²⁵ Within the Georgia legislature, there were myriad bills that sought to enshrine these collective land rights that had been observed for centuries. This is yet another example of the fusion of the Transportation and Market Revolutions as the very conception of rights was changing to keep up with material needs; Taylor, *The Transportation Revolution, 1815-1860*, 89.

¹²⁶ This corvée labor operated like a tax break for people (community members and regular workers) who worked on roads and rails; Taylor, *The Transportation Revolution, 1815-1860*, 16.

something that would not help them transport their goods to market or donate their labor.

Development, like virtually every other issue within the SPS, boiled down to an argument about class and equality.

Statistical Analysisⁱ

The statistical analysis of the vote records shows that the SPS existed in Georgia but raises questions as to when it ended (see appendix i). First, the table reveals that the SPS structured votes when legislators used it (i.e.. excepting 1850). Thus, the SPS structured elections and behavior, helping group ideologically similar people for the purpose of exercising political power. Second, the table shows that certain variables played little to no role in directly shaping behavior: religion, political incumbency, political class, and frontier status. Moreover, the crop variable requires further research to truly understand and digest it.¹²⁷

Regarding political behavior, the results show that party had a high correlation with vote outcome. That being said, the very low Rice Index scores hint at the presence of factions within the voting parties.¹²⁸ While it is easy to state that this division was simply unionists and states'-rights proponents, the utter lack of party cohesion and coherency in 1851 seems to undermine this position.¹²⁹ The impact of class is also surprising. Because the dataset uses statistics from the 1850 census, it should necessarily weight those findings closest to the dataset collection. Thus, it

¹²⁷ Egnal's thesis about the material division of Georgia is unlikely to hold under further analysis as food-stuff growers in Georgia were switching to cotton now that the railroad could bring them food cheaply and could take their cotton crop to markets (foreign and domestic); Egnal, *Clash of Extremes: The Economic Origins of the Civil War*.

¹²⁸ Rice Index = $\frac{i \cdot yes - no \vee \frac{i}{yes + no} \cdot i}{yes + no}$

¹²⁹ To best explore how those divisions operated, further iterations of this project will employ wnominate to find voting blocs and use an issue-by-issue breakdown of political baskets in the context of both parties and other variables.

is reasonable to assume that class and the slave population played key roles in determining voter behavior.

The post-1851 transition is the most intriguing part of the results. First, prior historical works largely see the 1851 election as the end of the SPS.¹³⁰ These results point in a different direction, raising the possibility that the SPS continued to exist into the mid-1850s. Moreover, the fallback on underlying cleavages (region, religion, class, population, and slavery) shows that the party system was in crisis but had not yet collapsed.¹³¹ Within the legislative record itself, it is clear that the Whig party was actively redefining itself. The best example of this is a proposed bill in the 1853 session wherein a section of the Whig Party tried to embrace Know-Nothingism by passing legislation restricting secret groups and religions outside the mainstream.¹³² While the literature states that the Whigs divided themselves into the Democratic and Know-Nothing camps, further statistical exploration is needed.

Additionally, the Rice Indices regarding particular issues are revealing: the shifting cohesion surrounding the key issues of banking, development, railroads, and taxes show that the parties had been in flux since 1845. Regarding banking, since the 1845, there was an average decline in the party cohesion. Internal developments and taxes remained a consistent venue of agreement for the Democrats as cohesion maintained the same level, even though the tumultuous 1851-1852 session. These indices show a Whig Party in decline. On every issue the Whigs dominated (mainly economic issues in Georgia as they were seen as the fiscally responsible party), they lost coherency throughout the scope of this study. Whereas Whigs were pretty

¹³⁰ Murray, *The Whig Party in Georgia*; Montgomery, *Cracker Parties*; Carey, *Parties Slavery, and the Union in Antebellum Georgia*

¹³¹ This is especially evident in the uptick of religious significance as the Temperance party based in Methodist principles arose in the mid 1850s.

¹³² *Journal of the House of Representatives of the State of Georgia, 1853&1854*, 67, 667.

unified on bills relating to railroads and business pre-1851, their most coherent issue in 1853 was the senatorial election. Thus, the Whig party, while still existing, had endured a fatal blow within the political class as the party was less efficient at passing legislation and was, therefore, unlikely to regain political power without a coherent platform. This project raises many questions regarding the political fragmentation of both federal and state governments preceding secession.¹³³ This research does show, however, that there existed a political class in Georgia searching for a viable opportunity to form opposition following the tumult of 1851 and 1852.

Conclusion

The SPS existed in Georgia. While the exact timing of its collapse requires further examination, the SPS very clearly satisfies all four criteria of party systems. First, the SPS obviously organized political behavior, as is evident in the table. Second, the SPS structured multiple consecutive elections. Third, the SPS provided a sense of predictability for voters. While the low Rice-Index scores indicate that the parties were diverse, the high explanatory power of the parties in shaping legislator actions means that people could reasonably predict what a legislator would do (based on local predilections and contexts). Finally, the statistical results show that the SPS rested on substantive societal cleavages, namely class, region, population, and slavery. Thus, the SPS was not simply an electoral vehicle for enterprising individuals (as some historians have asserted); it reflected political disagreements and organized people accordingly. The political fragmentation preceding secession is evident in Georgia wherein the SPS was beginning to collapse. This created a class of politicians searching for an electoral vehicle and raises questions if these politicians drifted to secession. Ultimately, the fall

¹³³ Future research could do a number of things: use the *wnominate* function to better map possible voting blocs, explore if the additional variables (e.g. crop or class) created voting blocs for certain issues, integrate the political culture of the era into the political behavior.

of the SPS in Georgia illustrates how deeply embedded party systems are in the social fabric and political realities of their time, shaping elections, identities, and conflicts that defined the antebellum period and the imminent war.

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ⁱ This table lists the relevant p-values. As this study centers around finding the best descriptors and indicators, p-values (rather than coefficients) matter most. For party coherency, this study uses the Rice Scale wherein 0 means no cohesion and 1 means complete cohesion. * denotes confidence at the .10 level; ** denotes confidence at the .05 level; *** denotes confidence at $\leq .005$ confidence

	1845 n=5804	1847 n=5570	1849 n=5296	1851 (U&SR) n=4897	1853 n=4559
Party Cohesion (D &U)	0.13994169	.04201681	.06671636	.055036345	.08103728
Party Cohesion (W&SR)	.05620915	.02435581	.02181401	.003281999	.22429460
Party Correlation (D&U)	0.000000000000274***	.028**	.000554** *	.1498	0.0000578***
Party Correlation (W&SR)	0.00138**	.0133**	.001278** *	.0878*	<2e-16***
Region (DeBats)	.73431	.0742*	.000475** *	.44	2.45e-06***
Religion	.563	.114	.6	.256	.0185**
Incumbency	.00424**	.189	.1219	.696	.675223
Political Class (Prolonged Incumbency)	.993	.405	.794	.63	.62
Class	.376	.409	.003334** *	.837	0.000000000195***
White Population	.490061	.478	.0664*	.862	0.000000161***
Slave Proportion	.166	.206	.00114***	.978	0.000000000357***
Slave Population	.0578*	.291	.075*	.644	0.00000000206***
Frontier	.383	.237	.705	.46	.6438
Crop	.785	.0243**	.7643	.351	.04035*

1845	Senator Elections & Federal Relations N=494	Banking N=97	Race N=100	Family & Gender N=112	Railroads N=85	Judicial Elections & Democratization N=556	Bills of Attainder & Pardons N=1038	Legislative Procedure & Adjournment N=427	Tax N=398	Legal Rights Judicial Proceed N=
Party Cohesion (D)	0.19480519	.1818182	.3725490	.4642857	.1052632	.1895911	.1354582	.02415459	.26984127	
Party Cohesion (W)	0.01901141	.4339623	.6734694	.1428571	.7872340	.1777003	.1231343	.40969163	.07177033	

1845	Business, Licensure, & Charters N=1103	Internal Development, Public Lands, & Land Rights N=768	County Changes N=110	Capital Changes N=313	Miscellaneous N=196
Party Cohesion (D)	.1025145	.2351275	.1923077	.3288591	.18604651
Party Cohesion (W&SR)	.1740614	.2096386	.4137931	.3292683	.07272727

1847	Senator Elections & Federal Relations N=125	Banking N=218	Race N=	Family & Gender N=106	Railroads N=1158	Judicial Elections & Democratization N=234	Bills of Attainder & Pardons N=445	Legislative Procedure & Adjournment N=430	Tax N=748	Legal Rights Judicial Procedures N=316
Party Cohesion (D)	.9672131	.082568 81		.0196078 4	.3698630	.2409639	.1720930	.21126761	.34 261 84	.45098
Party Cohesion (W)	.9687500	.027522 94		.2	.1533101	.3214286	.1826087	.03225806	.23 393 32	.27607

1847	Business, Licensure, & Charters N=114	Internal Development, Public Lands, & Land Rights N=329				County Changes N= 217	Capital Changes N= 475	Miscellaneous N=115		
Party Cohesion (D)	.2452830	.2195122				.04	.1234043	.6		
Party Cohesion (W)	.9016393	.5393939				.5209581	.275	1		

1849	Senator Elections & Federal Relations N= 343	Banking N=390	Race N= 117	Family & Gender N= 109	Railroads N=178	Judicial Elections & Democratization N=338	Bills of Attainder & Pardons N=175	Legislative Procedure & Adjournment N=637	Tax N= 866	Legal Rights Judicial Procedures N= 408
Party Cohesion (D)	.8682635	.128205 1	.129 0323	.2363636	.4782609	.7209302	.3684211	.5108359	.23 543 12	.12796
Party Cohesion (W)	.4090909	.271749	.818 1818	.1851852	.9534884	.4216867	.45	.1273885	.14 416 48	.83756

1849	Business, Licensure, & Charters N=95	Internal Development, Public Lands, & Land Rights N=702				County Changes N= 101	Capital Changes N= 233	Miscellaneous N= 294		
Party Cohesion (D)	.708333	.2402235				.8490566	.0862069	.24503311		
Party Cohesion (W)	.4893617	.1279070				.8333333	.5213675	.03496503		

1851	Senator Elections & Federal Relations N=	Banking N=210	Race N= 114	Family & Gender N= 178	Railroads N=616	Judicial Elections & Democratization N=124	Bills of Attainder & Pardons N=285	Legislative Procedure & Adjournment N=775	Tax N= 393	Legal Rights Judicial Procedures N=100
Party Cohesion (U)		.170731 7	.119 0476 2	.0068072 721	.0876494	.05154639	.11587983	.01426307	.14 193 55	.15960
Party Cohesion (SR)		.565217 4	.043 4782 6	.4193548 39	.2105263	1	.07692308	.3472222	.10 843 37	.29353

1851	Business, Licensure, & Charters N=184	Internal Development, Public Lands, & Land Rights N=373	County Changes N= 462	Capital Changes N=	Miscellaneous N=
Party Cohesion (U)	.2413793	.2450331	.2819149		
Party Cohesion (SR)	.1794872	.04225352	.5116279		

1853	Senator Elections & Federal Relations N=159	Banking N= 238	Race N=	Family & Gender N= 91	Railroads N=687	Judicial Elections & Democratization N=196	Bills of Attainder & Pardons N=354	Legislative Procedure & Adjournment N=865	Tax N= 826	Legal Rights Judicia Proced N=170
Party Cohesion (D)	.2272727	.045454 55		.3469388	.1117166	.1214953	.1979167	.1890756	.27 477 477	.31914
Party Cohesion (W)	.8028169	.320754 72		.5238095	.48125	.6179775	.2098765	.3419023	.03 664 921	.05263

1853	Business, Licensure, & Charters N=66	Internal Development, Public Lands, & Land Rights N=248	County Changes N= 377	Capital Changes N= 93	Miscellaneous N= 93
Party Cohesion (D)	.5	.3870968	.1165049	.4285714	.1836735
Party Cohesion (W)	.53	0	.2982456	.2272727	.8636364